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Resumo
Em um mundo cada vez mais conectado, uma diversidade de softwares e sensores coletam
dados dos ambientes e seus habitantes. Devido à riqueza das informações coletadas, privaci-
dade se torna um requisito importante. Aplicações estão sendo desenvolvidas, e, apesar de
existirem princípios e regras para lidar com a privacidade dos indivíduos, faltam metodolo-
gias para guiar a integração das diretrizes de privacidade em um processo de desenvolvi-
mento. Metodologias existentes como o Privacidade desde a Concepção (do inglês Privacy
by Design – PbD) ainda são vagas e deixam muitos questionamentos em aberto sobre como
aplicá-las na prática. Neste trabalho, nós propomos o conceito de Privacidade por Evidência
(do inglês Privacy by Evidence – PbE), uma metodologia de desenvolvimento de software
para prover privacidade. Dada a dificuldade em prover privacidade total, propomos que as
documentações das mitigações sejam em formas de evidências de privacidade, objetivando
aumentar a confiança no projeto. Para validar a eficácia, PbE tem sido utilizada durante o
desenvolvimento de quatro aplicações que servem como estudos de caso. O primeiro estudo
de caso considerado é uma aplicação de medição inteligente de energia; o segundo considera
uma aplicação de contagem e monitoramento de pessoas; o terceiro considera um sistema
de monitoramento de eficiência energética; e o quarto considera um sistema de autenticação
de dois fatores. Para estas aplicações, os times proveram sete, cinco, cinco e quatro evidên-
cias de privacidade, respectivamente, e concluimos que a PbE pode ser efetiva em ajudar a
entender e a tratar as necessidades de proteção à privacidade quando se está desenvolvendo
software.
i
Abstract
In an increasingly connected world, a diversity of software and sensors collect data from the
environment and its inhabitants. Because of the richness of the information collected, privacy
becomes an important requirement. Applications are being developed, and, although there
are principles and rules regarding the privacy of individuals, there is still a lack of method-
ologies to guide the integration of privacy guidelines into the development process. Existing
methodologies like the Privacy by Design (PbD) are still vague and leave many open ques-
tions on how to apply them in practice. In this work we propose the concept of Privacy by
Evidence (PbE), a software development methodology to provide privacy assurance. Given
the difficulty in providing total privacy in many applications, we propose to document the
mitigations in form of evidences of privacy, aiming to increase the confidence of the project.
To validate its effectiveness, PbE has been used during the development of four applications
that serve as case studies. The first considered case study is a smart metering application;
the second considers a people counting and monitoring application; the third considers an
energy efficiency monitoring system; and the fourth considers a two factor authentication
system. For these applications, the teams were able to provide seven, five, five, and four
evidences of privacy, respectively, and we conclude that PbE can be effective in helping to
understand and to address the privacy protection needs when developing software.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Contextualization
Privacy concerns exist wherever personally identifiable information or other sensitive in-
formation is improperly collected, stored, used or disclosed. It is known that conventional
authentication and encryption mechanisms are not always enough to solve privacy concerns.
In some cases, the entity able to authenticate and to decrypt the data may also play the role of
the adversary and, therefore, may infer sensitive information from the received data. More-
over, such entities may:
• Negotiate and export data to third parties;
• Suffer external attacks;
• Suffer internal attacks (e.g., malicious employees).
Previous research shows that internal attacks are the major concerns. In the health indus-
try, the estimated loss of an external attack in 2013 was about $50.000, whereas that of an
internal attack was about $2.7 million [40]. Previous research also shows that approximately
40% of people who have had their privacy violated have discontinued their relationships
with the companies, and this may be one of the reasons for the existence of evidences that
companies do not disclose all violations that occur (reporting 1/3, on average) [40].
Manipulating sensitive data in a irresponsible way can have significant negative legal,
financial, and regulatory consequences on the data custodian. Some examples:
1
1.2 Problem 2
• With the intention of providing a real data set to be used by researchers working in
the area of Internet search, AOL posted search queries from its clients on the web.
New York Times reporters were able to re-identify one individual from these queries
[90]. The bad publicity from this resulted in the CTO of the company resigning and
the researcher who posted the data to lose his job.
• A re-identification attack on a movie ratings data set for a competition organized by
Netflix [10] resulted in Netflix canceling a second competition and settling a class
action lawsuit. This had financial and reputational impacts on the organization.
Various applications may collect data and provide benefits and useful utilities, however,
from examples like many Internet of Things (IoT) applications, it is possible to observe that
the concerns about privacy only grow, and being able to state that a company or application
is “privacy-friendly” may be a competitive advantage [22; 39]. To avoid the development of
harmful applications (not only for users, but also for companies), it is necessary to follow an
appropriate methodology to apply techniques that are intrinsic to privacy. Almost every day,
the media publishes news with evidences that show that not applying such techniques can
have devastating consequences.
When developing a privacy-friendly application (i.e., an application which has privacy as
a non-functional requirement), it is important to deal with many concepts. For example, to
provide their features, applications may collect and store large amounts of data and in differ-
ent formats; table records, time series, graphs, text, images, among many others. The format
of the data is related to each application. More importantly, these data possess different sen-
sitivity levels for different users. There are also rules to follow and techniques to apply, but,
unfortunately, preventive measures have the potential to limit data utility or to make some
features unavailable or infeasible. Thus, we face a Privacy vs. Utility trade-off.
1.2 Problem
In this context, we address the following problem: In a software development, how to guide
developers to take conscious decisions that will improve the privacy of users, and still allow
the desired features to keep working? How to organize a sequence of steps to implement
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privacy mechanisms considering a risk analysis process? Almost every day, the media pub-
lishes news regarding privacy incidents showing that not applying such mechanisms can have
devastating consequences.
Unfortunately, there is a lack of methodologies to guide the development of privacy-
friendly applications and to apply in practice the existing privacy guidelines and rules [46].
Companies, developers and users would benefit from the existence of a methodology.
1.3 Our Proposal
In this work, we propose Privacy by Evidence (PbE): a novel methodology that guides the
implementation of privacy concepts in applications. This methodology includes risk assess-
ment, mitigations and tests as crucial activities of the development cycle. Given the general
impossibility in providing total privacy (i.e., free of vulnerabilities), we propose to document
the mitigations in form of evidences, aiming to increase the confidence. To document the ar-
gumentation and evidences, we use the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [45]. We validate
the effectiveness of PbE through the development of four case studies.
1.4 Summary of Contributions
The first part of our research sought to identify methodologies that help developers and
companies to develop privacy-friendly applications. We found several guides for specific
activities, such as norms, user perception studies, privacy techniques, and attacks. However,
we did not find a generic methodology that considers all these concepts together. Recom-
mendations such as the Privacy by Design (PbD) [31] are abstract and rarely used in practice
[46].
The second part of our research included the creation of a methodology that considers
the various relevant privacy concepts found in the literature.
The third part of the research sought to improve and validate the proposed methodology
through the development of three case studies with participation of the author. Through a
smart energy metering, a people counting, and an energy efficiency application, we found
that PbE might be an effective way to implement privacy protections in applications. We
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identified that privacy protection activities must be in a constant cycle of evolution, since
new risks can always be detected. The privacy techniques used in the case studies are in
accordance with the definition by Stallings et al. [92]: “Privacy assures that individuals
control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored and by
whom and to whom that information may be disclosed".
Finally, the fourth part of the research sought to validate the methodology through the
development of a case study (a two factor authentication system) without the participation
of the author. For this, the Think Aloud method [27; 91] was used to gather information
regarding the usage of PbE by the development team without influencing what participants
say and do, and hence, use such useful information as feedback in order to improve the
methodology.
1.5 Organization
This document is organized as follows: in Chapter 2 we provide the background and the
privacy concepts. Following, in Chapter 3, we present the PbE, our proposed methodol-
ogy. In Chapter 4 we present the first case study, a smart metering application which uses
information regarding energy consumption. In Chapter 5 we present the second case study,
a people counting and tracking application. In Chapter 6 we present the third case study,
an energy efficiency application which correlates energy and people counting data aiming
to detect consumption anomalies (inefficient periods). In Chapter 7 we present the fourth
case study, a two factor authentication system. Finally, in Chapter 8, we return the general
discussion regarding the contributions and the lessons learned.
Chapter 2
Background
There is currently a great interest in the data collected by modern applications. Data that
reveal information regarding public environments, energy consumption, financial balance,
health status, and geographical locations are just some examples of contexts. Large volumes
of data can now be analyzed quite efficiently to gain new insights for users and service
providers. “Big data” is one of the most discussed phrases today, specially in IoT [15; 36;
76; 52], however, such data analysis may also raise privacy concerns.
In addition to the application context, there are many other concepts that should be con-
sidered when dealing with privacy preserving. This chapter presents the necessary back-
ground presenting such concepts.
2.1 Related Work
This section presents a review of relevant works in the context of methodologies for devel-
oping privacy-friendly applications. Because privacy concerns and mitigations are relatively
recent, there is not much research related to this methodological challenge. In the analysis
of the related works, several limitations and open problems are identified.
To ensure privacy protection, we must take into account principles and guidelines
about individuals’ privacy, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [96], and the Privacy by Design (PbD) [31]. PbD consists in 7 foundational princi-
ples to be followed when developing systems that should take into account users privacy:
• Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial: The PbD approach is charac-
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terized by proactive rather than reactive measures. It anticipates and prevents privacy
invasive events before they happen. PbD does not wait for privacy risks to materialize,
nor does it offer remedies for resolving privacy infractions once they have occurred –
it aims to prevent them from occurring. In short, PbD comes before-the-fact, not after.
• Privacy as the Default Setting: PbD seeks to deliver the maximum degree of privacy
by ensuring that personal data are automatically protected in any given IT system or
business practice. If an individual does nothing, their privacy still remains intact. No
action is required on the part of the individual to protect their privacy – it is built into
the system, by default.
• Privacy Embedded into Design: PbD is embedded into the design and architecture of
IT systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an add-on, after the fact. The
result is that privacy becomes an essential component of the core functionality being
delivered. Privacy is integral to the system, without diminishing functionality.
• Full Functionality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum: PbD seeks to accommodate all
legitimate interests and objectives in a positive-sum “win-win” manner, not through
a dated, zero-sum approach, where unnecessary trade-offs are made. PbD avoids the
pretense of false dichotomies, such as privacy vs. security, demonstrating that it is
possible to have both.
• End-to-End Security – Full Lifecycle Protection: PbD, having been embedded into
the system prior to the first element of information being collected, extends securely
throughout the entire lifecycle of the data involved – strong security measures are
essential to privacy, from start to finish. This ensures that all data are securely retained,
and then securely destroyed at the end of the process, in a timely fashion. Thus, PbD
ensures cradle to grave, secure lifecycle management of information, end-to-end.
• Visibility and Transparency – Keep it Open: PbD seeks to assure all stakeholders
that whatever the business practice or technology involved, it is in fact, operating ac-
cording to the stated promises and objectives, subject to independent verification. Its
component parts and operations remain visible and transparent, to users and providers
alike.
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• Respect for User Privacy – Keep it User-Centric: Above all, PbD requires archi-
tects and operators to keep the interests of the individual uppermost by offering such
measures as strong privacy defaults, appropriate notice, and empowering user-friendly
options.
The definition of these principles alone are not enough. Gürses et al. [46] argue that while
these principles are useful to guide development, they are still vague and leave many open
questions on how to apply them in practice. For example, the fourth principle (Full Function-
ality – Positive-Sum, not Zero-Sum) classifies trade-offs as unnecessary because PbD seeks
to accommodate the objectives in a “win-win” manner. However, there is no explanation
and demonstration on how to achieve that. Through case studies, Gürses et al. demonstrate
that there is not only one way to tackle privacy protection problems, and conclude that the
development of a generalizable methodology is necessary. Our work acknowledges this and
describes a methodology to ensure privacy preservation in various contexts.
The Nokia institute published a white paper [74] on how to use privacy protection poli-
cies. The paper states that there is a lack of privacy experts, so, a software engineering
discipline called Privacy Engineering & Assurance is proposed. This discipline aims to be a
systematic approach in the implementation of the PbD principles, and yet, foster the birth of
a new professional, the Privacy Engineer. Despite the relevance, the introduction to new top-
ics and concepts on its own is not enough. We still need a detailed methodology to know how
to organize the development workflow and to guide the implementation of privacy-friendly
applications.
Ionescu et al. [51] propose an argumentative structure to privacy cases, matching the
privacy-protection goals to human and organizational privacy concerns. They seek to anal-
yse privacy risks from the perspectives of different stakeholders, and provide convincing
argumentation that support technical solutions in mitigating privacy risks. Our work recog-
nizes the need of a solid and easy argumentative structure to provide evidences which support
the privacy assurance.
The Privacy Management Reference Model and Methodology (PMRM) [2] is a proposal
of the Advancing Open Standards for the Information Society (OASIS) which has high level
guidelines to help business process engineers, IT analysts, architects, and developers in im-
plementing privacy and security policies. By having a focus on policies, PMRM lacks guide-
2.2 Conceptual Framework 8
lines on how to deal with many other important privacy concepts, such as user perceptions,
utility tradeoffs, privacy techniques, metrics, and attacks. For not being dense, high level and
focused on policies such as PMRM, PbE is a simple and development-driven proposal.
In another related work, Samani et al. [85] propose an architectural framework to ensure
privacy based on the interactions that happen between IoT objects. The framework intends
to restrict non-authorized operations, neutralizing the execution of such operations in the
data of users. This neutralization happens with the integration of penalty (report privacy
violations to authorities) and preventing operations (like anonymization techniques) to the
communication protocol used by the objects. Although very useful, the work of Samani et
al. does not address the Privacy vs. Utility trade-off and also does not suggest a sequence of
acts of risk analysis and threat mitigation (for instance, investigating possible attacks).
Considering the related work, we can notice a lack of methodologies to guide the devel-
opment and that considers important concepts like norms, perception studies, privacy tech-
niques, trade-offs and attacks. Our novel proposed methodology considers such concepts
and increases the confidence of the project through the provision of privacy evidences.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
In this section we describe the key concepts when dealing with privacy. The goal is to
generate a manageable knowledge that is used in our proposed methodology. The conceptual
framework with the key concepts identified by us is presented in Figure 2.1. We describe
these concepts in the next sections.
2.2.1 Participants
Figure 2.2 presents the possible participants/stakeholders in a typical scenario when devel-
oping a privacy-friendly application. They are:
• User: The user of the application. Software and sensors may collect sensitive data
from the user and transmit to remote servers.
• Product Owner: Entity that represents the executives. Initiates the project, finances it,
contracts it out, and benefits from its output(s). Part of an owner responsibility is to
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Figure 2.1: Key concepts when dealing with privacy.
have a vision of the requirements, and convey that vision to the development team.
• Development Team: Responsible for developing and delivering the project in accor-
dance to the requirements (including data privacy and utility requirements).
• Regulatory Agency: Responsible for exercising autonomous authority and establishing
privacy guidelines and rules. These preventive rules combined with penalty mecha-
nisms can help preventing potentially dangerous activities.
• Privacy Engineer: Responsible for risk analysis, development and evaluation of pri-
vacy techniques, provision of evidences, simulation of attacks and assurance that the
privacy norms established by the regulatory agencies are being followed.
• Adversary: Entity which seeks to violate the users privacy obtaining sensitive infor-
mation. May perform many attacks depending on the application context, data format
and privacy techniques.
• Data Recipient: Third party who is interested in the published data and may conduct
data analysis in sensitive data.
The application environment contains the building blocks of the system, such as sensors,
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Figure 2.2: Possible participants when developing a privacy-friendly application.
servers, service APIs and databases. It may collect the data from users and publish to third
parties or the public. A typical scenario of data collection and publishing is, for example,
in health care. Through smart health devices, a hospital collects data from patients and
publishes these records to an external medical center. In this example, the devices and the
hospital are in the application environment, patients are users, and the medical center is the
data recipient. The data analysis conducted at the medical center could be any task from a
simple count of the number of men with diabetes to a sophisticated cluster analysis to make
health insurances more profitable.
An adversary model may consider that the data recipient is untrusted. If the environment
is trusted and users are willing to provide their personal information, there may be still a
problem if the trust is transitive, i.e., the data recipient be untrusted. In practice, different
contexts may have different adversary assumptions and requirements.
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2.2.2 Application Context
In different application contexts, the privacy and utility requirements may differ. Smart
energy meters, social networks, geolocation systems, finance, and medical applications are
some examples of application contexts. The identification of the context is essential, since
different utilities can be provided when processing the data. More importantly, different
application contexts can be target of different attacks and privacy violations, and therefore,
the usage of different privacy protection techniques is required.
2.2.3 Data Format
In order to provide their features more precisely and specific for each individual, applications
may collect large amounts of data. This data can exist in different formats; table records, time
series, network traffic, graphs, text, images, among many others. The format in which the
data is presented usually is related to the application context and different privacy protection
techniques may be applied to different data formats.
2.2.4 Data Sensitivity
In the most basic form, a data unit may be or contain one of the following:
• Explicit Identifier: Set of attributes, such as name, email, phone number and IP ad-
dress, containing information that explicitly identifies users.
• Quasi Identifier: Set of attributes that could potentially identify users such as ZIP
code, sex and date of birth. We call QID the set of attributes and qid the values of this
set.
• Sensitive: Consist of sensitive person-specific information such as disease, energy
consumption, salary, and disability status.
• Non-Sensitive: Consist of all information that do not fall into the previous three cate-
gories.
More importantly, the sensitive data also possess different sensitivity levels (e.g., low,
medium and high). There are some standards of classification of sensitive data [93], however,
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in practice, the classification depends on the context and population. Improper collection and
usage of sensitive data may be a privacy violation.
2.2.5 Privacy Norms and Legislation
Establishing norms to restrict the usage of sensitive data is one of the preventive methods
for privacy protection. Preventive norms combined with punishing mechanisms (such as re-
porting violations to authorities) can help preventing potentially dangerous activities. Many
regulatory agencies have proposed privacy norms that must be followed.
As an example, the HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) [96]
established the Safe Harbor standard, which is a precise method for anonymization of health
information. It stipulates the removal or generalization of 18 variables from a data set:
1. Names;
2. All geographic subdivisions smaller than a state, including street address, city, county,
precinct, ZIP code, and their equivalent geocodes, except for the initial three digits of
a ZIP code if, according to the current publicly available data from the Bureau of the
Census:
a) The geographic unit formed by combining all ZIP codes with the same three
initial digits contains more than 20,000 people.
b) The initial three digits of a ZIP code for all such geographic units containing
20,000 or fewer people is changed to 000.
3. All elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including
birth date, admission date, discharge date, and date of death; and all ages over 89 and
all elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and
elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older;
4. Telephone numbers;
5. Fax numbers;
6. Electronic mail addresses;
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7. Social security numbers;
8. Medical record numbers;
9. Health plan beneficiary numbers;
10. Account numbers;
11. Certificate/ license numbers;
12. Vehicle identifiers and serial numbers, including license plate numbers;
13. Device identifiers and serial numbers;
14. Web universal resource locators (URLs);
15. Internet protocol (IP) address numbers;
16. Biometric identifiers, including finger and voice prints;
17. Full face photographic images and any comparable images;
18. Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.
The certainty and simplicity of Safe Harbor makes it quite attractive for health informa-
tion custodians when disclosing data without patient consent, and it is used quite often in
practice [40].
Another regulation is the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) [3], which is to be
enforceable in the European Union from 25 May 2018. The aim of the GDPR is to “protect
all European citizens from privacy and data breaches”, and has the following key points:
• Territorial Scope: The GDPR applies to the processing of personal data of Europen
ciyizens by controllers and processors, regardless their locations;
• Penalties: Organizations in breach of GDPR can be imposed for the infringements;
• Consent: Users consent must be clear and distinguishable from other matters and pro-
vided in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.
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Beyond the key points, GDPR stipulates Privacy by Design as a legal requirement during
the development, and the European citizens have the following rights: the right to be notified
when a data breach occurs, the right to access their data (and in a portable format), the right
to be forgotten, and the right to restriction of processing.
Unfortunately, norms or regulations such as GDPR and HIPAA usually are not enough
to guide developers in developing privacy-friendly applications. This is why the provision
of concrete evidences of privacy and the implementation of other counter-measures such
as conducting privacy perception studies, implementing privacy techniques, and evaluating
potential attacks, becomes necessary.
2.2.6 Users Perception of Privacy
Different people usually exhibit different perceptions of privacy, i.e., they associate the word
privacy with a diversity of meanings. For example, some people believe that privacy is
the right to control what information about them may be made public [87; 16; 66; 104].
Other people believe that if someone cares about privacy is because he/she is involved in
wrongdoing [20].
Different perceptions of privacy originate different types of concerns about privacy. For
example, some people tend to provide the information requested by the system only if it
presents a privacy policy. Privacy policy is a legal document and software artifact that fulfills
a legal requirement to protect the user privacy. It answers important questions about the
software’s operation, including what personal identifiable information is collected, for what
purpose is it used, and with whom is it shared [23].
The application of surveys and/or the conduction of interviews may cover and help to
understand many privacy aspects, such as: (i) general perceptions, beliefs and attitudes; (ii)
perceptions about data collection and control; (iii) perceptions about information inference;
(iv) perception about information usage; and (v) perceptions about possibilities of data ex-
change (not only leakage) [80].
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2.2.7 Privacy Techniques
The raw data usually does not satisfy specified privacy requirements and it must be modified
before the disclosure. The modification is done by applying privacy techniques which may
come in several flavors, like anonymization [35], generalization [95], noise addition [13],
zero-knowledge proofs [44] and the usage of homomorphic encryption [58]. As an example,
anonymization refers to the approach that seeks to hide the identity of users, assuming that
sensitive data must be retained for data analysis. Clearly, explicit identifiers of users must be
removed.
Several techniques may work for the same context and data format. The objective of
such techniques is to protect sensitive user data from possible privacy violations. It may also
include the provision of the control of what information may be disclosed to the service, data
recipients or other users.
2.2.8 Attacks
A privacy attack is an attempt to expose, steal or gain unauthorized access to sensitive data.
Unfortunately, applying norms and privacy techniques may not be enough and real attack-
ers may have success in violating the user privacy when exploiting flaws in the norms and
privacy techniques. Thus, before the deployment of the application, privacy engineers may
simulate attacks, seeking to explore and fix additional privacy breaches. Attack simulation
reports may also assess potential impacts to the organization and suggest countermeasures
to reduce risks.
As an example of attack, even with all explicit identifiers removed, an individual’s name
in a public voter list may be linked with his record in a published medical database through
the combination of ZIP code, date of birth, and sex, as shown in Figure 2.3. Each of these
attributes does not uniquely identify a user, but their combination, called the quasi-identifier
(qid value), often singles out a unique or a small number of users. Research showed that
87% of the U.S. population had reported characteristics that made them unique based on
only such quasi-identifiers [94].
In the example of Figure 2.3, the user is re-identified by linking his qid. To perform such
linking attacks, the attacker needs two pieces of prior knowledge: the victim’s record in the
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Figure 2.3: Linking attack to re-identify users [95].
released data and the qid of the victim. Such knowledge can be obtained by observations.
For example, the attacker noticed that his boss was hospitalized, and, therefore, knew that
his boss’s medical record would appear in the released patient database. In another example,
it is not difficult for an adversary to obtain his boss’s ZIP code, date of birth, and sex, which
could serve as the quasi-identifier in linking attacks.
Besides linking attacks, other examples of attacks may include filtering (when applying
noise addition techniques), integer factorization and discrete logarithm computation (when
applying homomorphic encryption, for example), and side-channel attacks.
2.2.9 Privacy Models
To prevent attacks such as linkage through quasi-identifiers and to quantify the privacy levels,
it is necessary to validate the privacy technique using formal privacy models. Sweeney et al.
[94] propose the notion of k-anonymity: If one user has some value qid, at least k − 1 other
records also have the value qid. In other words, the minimum equivalence group size on
QID is at least k. A data set satisfying this requirement is called k-anonymous. In a k-
anonymous data set, each user is indistinguishable from at least k − 1 other records with
respect to QID. Consequently, the probability of linking a victim to a specific user through
QID is at most 1/k.
Another insightful privacy model is the -differential privacy: the risk to the user’s pri-
vacy should not substantially increase as a result of participating in a statistical database.
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Dwork [37] proposes to compare the risk with and without the user’s data in the published
data. Consequently, the privacy model called -differential privacy ensures that the removal
or addition of a single element does not significantly affect the outcome of any analysis.
Considering a data set as a set of participants, we say data sets D1 and D2 differ in at
most one element if one is a proper subset of the other and the larger data set contains just
one additional participant. Therefore, a randomized function F gives -differential privacy
if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all S ⊆ Range(F ),
Pr[F (D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() × Pr[F (D2) ∈ S], where the probability is taken over the
randomness of function F [37].
The  value is the privacy metric and for better privacy, a small value is desirable. A
mechanism F satisfying this definition addresses concerns that any participant might have
about the leakage of his personal information: even if the participant removed his data from
the data set, no outputs (and thus consequences of outputs) would become significantly more
or less likely.
Differential privacy is achieved by the addition of noise whose magnitude is a function of
the largest change a single user could have on the output to the query function; this quantity
is referred as the sensitivity of the function.
Besides k-anonymity and -differential privacy, there are many other privacy models, as
presented in Table 2.1. The privacy model to use depends on the attack model, application
context, data format, privacy technique, and other factors.
2.2.10 Data Utility
We consider data utility as the usefulness of the data for the achievement of the primary
features of the application. A utility metric may measure the quality and the business value
attributed to data within specific usage contexts.
In the previous sections, we presented only concepts regarding privacy. However, regard-
ing utility, in order to provide their features more precisely and specific for each individual,
applications may collect a large of data which may be useful for many purposes. Privacy pre-
ventive measures may have the potential to limit the data utility, or even prevent the operation
of some feature. Thus, we are facing a Utility vs. Privacy trade-off. In the development of
an application, it is necessary to ensure that the privacy of the users will not be compromised
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Table 2.1: Privacy Models [42]. A tick represents the coverage of an attack model.
Privacy Model
Attack Model
Record Attribute Table Probabilistic
linkage linkage linkage attack
k-Anonymity [95] 3
MultiR k-Anonymity [70] 3
l-Diversity [62] 3 3
Confidence Bounding [98] 3
(a, k)-Anonymity [102] 3 3
(X , Y )-Privacy [97] 3 3
(k, e)-Anonymity [57] 3 3
(, m)-Anonymity [61] 3
Personalized Privacy [103] 3
t-Closeness [72] 3 3
δ-Presence [70] 3
(c, t)-Isolation [34] 3 3
-Differential Privacy [37] 3 3
(d, γ)-Privacy [83] 3 3
Distributional Privacy [24] 3 3
and still allow the largest possible number of the services keep functioning.
2.2.11 Security
Despite the focus in privacy, it is necessary to notice the fact that the security of the system
is also vitally important. It is known that privacy is a sub-area of security, more specifi-
cally, in confidentiality. In fact, it is very common to see even professionals of Information
Technology mixing the concepts between security and privacy. However, more recently, re-
search on privacy are taking different directions than research on security. For example, data
analysis for infering human behavior is considered a hot topic in privacy, whereas software
vulnerabilities is a hot topic in security.
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A system with security vulnerabilities transitively compromises the data privacy and if
an attacker seizes control of the application, the privacy will be at risk. To address these
concerns, it is necessary the inclusion of practices used in security assurance methodologies,
such as the execution of penetration testing to detect vulnerabilities in the involved elements.
To ensure that privacy is present in the whole communication process, it is necessary to
take preventive security measures, such as encrypting the data in transit and using signed
certificates to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks (MiTM) [92].
2.3 Discussion
We presented a general conceptual framework to be used when dealing with privacy preserv-
ing in software development. However, one question remains: how to organize these key
concepts when developing applications? We concluded that it would be interesting to have
a methodology that guides the development, applying in practice all these concepts. The
conceptual framework is to be used in subsequent parts of our research.
Chapter 3
Privacy by Evidence: Our Proposed
Methodology
According to the first and third principles of PbD [31], the team must act in a preventive
manner (not waiting for the violations to happen), and the analysis and risk mitigations must
be embedded into the design of the project. For this reason, our methodology consists in
the inclusion of a few activities conducted by a privacy team in parallel with the normal
development cycle. The parallelism of the privacy preserving activities and the common
development is important here, since the product owner does not want a long time to market.
If the development takes long, it can be harmful for the company (e.g., competitors may have
the same ideia).
Privacy by Evidence (PbE) begins with the identification of the application context and
the data formats, then, legislations are studied, providing evidences of privacy protection.
After that, a list of data utilities and their potential privacy risks is made. The next activi-
ties are to apply privacy protection techniques and evaluate potential attacks. Since we are
proposing an iterative methodology, the team can go back and re-execute the previous ac-
tivities, being in accordance with the normal software evolution cycle. These activities are
structured using a UML Activity Diagram, as shown in Figure 3.1. This chapter focuses on
explaining the workflow to be executed by the privacy team (right part in Figure 3.1).
Although we use the term “privacy team”, it is important to note that this team does not
need to have privacy experts. In fact, our goal is to guide common developers in doing pri-
vacy preserving activities. We separate the teams just to avoid biasing. In the next sections,
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we detail each of these activities.
Figure 3.1: The activities of Privacy by Evidence, a software development methodology to
provide privacy assurance.
3.1 Identify the Application Context and the Data Formats
In different application contexts, the collected data can exist in different formats. Smart
meters, people counting, social networks, geolocation systems and medical applications are
some examples of contexts. Time series, aggregated values, network traffic, graphs, geo-
graphic localizations and table records are some examples of data formats. The identifica-
tion of the context and the data format is essential, since different utilities can be provided
when processing the data. More importantly, different contexts and data formats can be tar-
get of different attacks and privacy violations, and therefore, the usage of different privacy
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protection techniques is required.
Possible artifacts of this activity may include:
• Engagement Report: Information regarding the application context, goals and scope;
• Datasets: Samples of the data formats. Most of the time, they do not need to be real.
They help the privacy team to understand how the user data would appear to other
participants and consequently, possible data manipulations.
3.2 Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Creating norms to restrict usage of sensitive data is one of the preventive methods for privacy
protection. Combined with punishing mechanisms (such as reporting violations to authori-
ties) they can help preventing potentially dangerous activities. Many agencies have proposed
privacy rules that must be followed. Being in accordance with these rules generates evi-
dences that privacy is being taken into account and implemented in the development. During
this activity, a study about existing norms must be made.
It is also valuable to study legislations, principles and guidelines proposed by organiza-
tions and governments. This activity precedes others because the team can not proceed to
implement something that is not allowed by the norms and legislations.
Norms and legislations depend on the regions and the companies. For example, in Brazil,
the rules for collecting and storing specific sensitive data could be very different from the
rules in United States of America (actually, between different states of USA, these could be
different too). Also, a company that develops software such as the Hewlett Packard (HP)
may have internal privacy norms different from Sony.
Possible artifacts of this activity may include:
• Summary of Norms: For different regions and companies, it may be the case of
having different norms and legislations;
• Implementation of Norms: Code parts of norm implementations and unit tests. For
example, using information flow annotations in Java [69], it is possible to perform
static checking on the fields specified by the Safe Harbor standard, presented in Sec-
tion 2.2.5;
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• Compliance Proofs: They are evidences of privacy. For example, certifications are
compliance proofs ensuring that the privacy practices meet the constraints defined by
the regulatory agencies.
3.3 Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
After the identification of the context and the data format, the team should try to list all the
potential utilities available after data processing (we consider as utilities everything that the
data can be used for, including possible privacy violation activities). Once the team has a list
of data utilities, it analyzes and classifies them in a risk level scale, which varies according
to the sensitivity of the available data and the adversary model. For instance, low, medium
or high level of privacy risk is a possible scale.
For a better classification of the privacy risks, we suggest the conduction of privacy
perception studies, where questionnaires and interviews are executed and the answers of the
target users are evaluated. These studies may help to understand the sensitivity of the data, to
define the adversary model and to elaborate the privacy policy document. Conducting such
perception studies and being in accordance with the concerns of the users are in accordance
with the seventh principle of PbD and also generate evidences of privacy (perhaps, the most
important ones).
Maybe for better perception studies, the privacy team wants to question users regarding
the real intended system. However, in a first iteration of our methodology, we do not recom-
mend to collect and use real user data. If serious privacy concerns are detected during the
first iteration, this can already cause serious damages. Thus, we only suggest the use of real
data in a second iteration, where a privacy policy document has already been presented to
the user, and privacy techniques and possible attacks have already been evaluated.
Possible artifacts of this activity may include:
• Utilities List: For what the data can be used for, including legitimate and bad purposes.
A utility has a sensitivity level, according to a defined scale;
• Perception Questionnaires: Set of questions designed to gain knowledge about users’
perceptions of the system;
3.4 Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques 24
• Perception Report: To consider the users’ perception in the design of the system is
also an evidence of privacy. This report may include statistics, and general privacy
recommendations for the system design;
• Privacy Concerns: Identified threats, based on the perception report, the developers
experience, or evaluations;
• Adversary Model: Defines the possible adversaries, such as other users, remote ser-
vices and third parties. It helps to understand the scope of the privacy mitigations.
• Privacy Policy: A document that fulfills a legal requirement to protect the user privacy.
3.4 Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Despite the existence and implementation of privacy norms, in fact, privacy protection is
not achieved yet and for this reason, sometimes it is necessary to apply privacy techniques.
Anonymization [35], generalization [95], noise addition [13], and use of homomorphic en-
cryption [58] are examples of possible privacy techniques. In Appendix A we present a
catalog of privacy techniques that may be useful in helping developers in choosing suited
ones. The catalog was created based on the experience of the author. We do not consider
technologies for the security of a system, for example firewalls, intrusion detection systems,
etc., but our focus to the techniques which directly act upon the information content.
Several techniques may work for the same context and data format. Therefore, through
evaluation of performance metrics such as computational time, cost, application complexity,
accuracy, scalability and fault tolerance, and through evaluation of metrics of formal privacy
models such as k-anonymity [95], l-diversity [62] and -differential privacy [37], it is decided
the privacy techniques to be applied. The application of privacy techniques and evaluation
through privacy metrics also generate evidences.
The privacy techniques are chosen based on the recommendations generated by the pri-
vacy perception study and in order to optimize the utilities list, created in the previous ac-
tivity. The team chooses the techniques that provide the greatest possible amount of utilities
that poses no threats and which inhibit the greatest possible amount of utilities that represent
threats to users privacy.
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The extraction of privacy goals from the privacy policy document may also help in choos-
ing the privacy techniques. Bhatia et al. [23] introduce a semiautomated framework that uses
a hybrid combination of crowdsourcing and natural language processing to improve the ex-
traction of privacy goals.
The application of a privacy technique may be a software feature and therefore, code parts
with the implementation may be generated. Unit tests can also be generated and attached into
a continous integration platform, thus, being verified automatically in different stages of the
software lifecycle.
Possible artifacts of this activity may include:
• Summary of Techniques: A catalog, with privacy techniques that can be applied,
considering the risk assessment executed in the previous activity;
• Techniques Report: Includes a comparison between the possible privacy techniques.
Besides the privacy models, the team may also consider other metrics, such as cost,
complexity and accuracy. The choice of good privacy techniques and the achievement
of high privacy levels are also evidences of privacy;
• Implementation of Techniques: Code parts with implementation of the privacy tech-
niques and the corresponding tests.
• New Utilities List: With the chosen privacy techniques, it is desirable to provide util-
ities that poses no privacy threats and to inhibit the utilities that represent threats;
3.5 Evaluate Potential Attacks
After the application of privacy techniques, the team must assure that the unwanted utilities
were in fact inhibited. For this reason, it simulates attacks, seeking to explore additional
privacy breaches and still search for unwanted utilities. Each unsuccessful attack serves as
an evidence that the privacy techniques were implemented in an effective manner and that
the data is protected against that kind of attack. In the event of a successful attack, the team
must execute the risk assessment again and then improve the techniques or seek for others
that better address the detected vulnerabilities.
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The simulation of attacks is considered as a software testing activity and can generate
scripts that could be integrated with the tests of the software and a continous integration
platform, thus, being verified automatically in different stages of the software lifecycle.
Possible artifacts of this activity may include:
• Summary of Attacks: A catalog, with the potential attacks. Includes the attack plan-
nings and their hypotheses;
• Attack Scripts: The scripts of the attacks to be performed;
• Attacks Report: May include experimental and analytical results of the performed
attacks as well as recommendations on how to fix identified flaws. Each unsuccessful
attack is an evidence of privacy.
3.6 Documentation
Table 3.1 shows a framework for the checklist with the possible artifacts to be generated in
each activity of the methodology. A goal of the privacy team may be to supply these artifacts
and fill the Supplied? column with check marks (3).
During the development process, the satisfability of privacy requirements and the gener-
ation of evidences and artifacts may be coupled into User Stories, as well as the definition of
Acceptance Criterias.
Even taking privacy aspects into consideration and with many collected evidences, one
can never state that a system is completely safe. New vulnerabilities can always be found
and yet, real attackers can explore breaches that were not detected by the privacy team. For
this reason, there is a need to a constant and iterative process, to analyze new risks and
consequently inhibit them. To represent this need, the artifacts should include the review
history and dates.
3.6.1 Privacy Case
The concept of the “safety case” has been adopted across many industries [54]. Based on the
results found in the safety literature, we define the term “privacy case” and apply some of
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Table 3.1: Framework for the checklist of the artifacts to be produced by PbE.
Activity Artifact Supplied?
Identify the Application Context and Data Formats
Engagement Report
Datasets
Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Summary of Norms
Implementation of Norms
Compliance Proofs
Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Utilities List
Perception Questionnaires
Perception Report
Privacy Concerns
Adversary Model
Privacy Policy
Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Summary of Techniques
Techniques Report
Implementation of Techniques
New Utilities List
Evaluate Potential Attacks
Summary of Attacks
Attack Scripts
Attacks Report
the recommendations in our development process. We define the purpose of a privacy case
in the following terms:
Definition 1 A privacy case communicates a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument
that a system preserves the users privacy when operating in a particular context.
Both argument and evidence are crucial elements of the privacy case that must go hand-
in-hand. An argument without supporting evidence is unfounded, and therefore unconvinc-
ing. Evidence without an argument is unexplained - it can be unclear that (or how) privacy
goals have been satisfied. To provide an evidence of privacy, the team should make the most
appropriate decision by using the most accurate information together with its knowledge,
experience and evaluations. Therefore, we define “evidence of privacy” in the following
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terms:
Definition 2 An envidence of privacy is a best-effort documentation, indicating an effective
privacy decision-making and an argument confirmation.
Despite the focus in privacy cases, we must pay attention to the fact that the security of
the system is also vitally important, as described in the fifth principle of PbD. A system with
security vulnerabilities transitively compromises the data privacy and if an attacker seizes
control of the system, the privacy will be at risk. To address these concerns, in parallel to our
privacy assurance methodology, we suggest the inclusion of practices used in security assur-
ance methodologies, such as the evaluation of penetration testing to detect vulnerabilities in
the involved elements.
3.6.2 GSN
For the privacy case, we consider the evidences of privacy as essential and we propose that
when collected, such evidences should be structured using the Structured Assurance Case
Metamodel (SACM) [75]. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [45] is an extension of SACM
and provides graphical argumentation notation that can be used to document explicitly the in-
dividual elements of any argument (claims, evidence and contextual information) and the re-
lationships that exist between these elements (i.e., how claims are supported by other claims,
and ultimately by evidence, and the context that is defined for the argument). Arguments
documented using GSN can help provide assurance of critical properties of systems, ser-
vices and organizations. Within Europe, GSN has been adopted by a growing number of
companies within safety-critical industries (such as aerospace, railways and defence) for the
presentation of safety arguments within safety cases [54]. In this work, we reuse these con-
cepts to what we defined as privacy cases.
When the elements of the GSN are linked together in a network, they are described as a
“goal structure”. The principal purpose of any goal structure is to show how goals (claims
about the system) are successively broken down into sub-goals until a point is reached where
claims can be supported by direct reference to available evidence. As part of this decom-
position, using the GSN is also possible to make clear the argument strategies adopted, the
rationale for the approach and the context in which goals are stated (e.g., the system scope
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or the assumed operational role).
The principal symbols of the notation are shown in Figure 3.2 (with example instances
of each concept). In this structure, as in most, there exist “top level” goals – statements that
the goal structure is designed to support. In this case, “The user privacy is being preserved”,
is the (singular) top level goal. Beneath the top level goal or goals, the structure is broken
down into sub-goals, either directly or, as in this case, indirectly through a strategy. The
argument strategy that addresses the top level goal is “Argument about protection when the
service is an adversary”. This strategy is then substantiated by a sub-goal. At some stage
in a goal structure, a goal statement is put forward that need not be broken down and can be
clearly supported by reference to some evidence. In this case, the goal “An adversary can
not infer behavioral information through energy data”, is supported by direct reference to
the evidence “Noise Addition has been implemented”.
Figure 3.2: An example goal structure.
Table 3.2 describes a sheet for the evidenceE2, making it easier for the participants of the
project to relate it to the corresponding privacy goals and concerns. Every evidence has an
identification and a reference to the PbE activity that generated such evidence, enabling the
traceability into the corresponding artifacts and the possibility to provide visibility and trans-
parency, according to the sixth principle of PbD. The description of an evidence provides in-
formation for how the evidence fulfills its driving goals. It may also contain links with more
details regarding the provided evidence, status, review date, and an evidence weight. Some
evidences may be more valuable than others and therefore, we encourage teams to choose
the weight using a voting system similar to Scrum poker [68].
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Table 3.2: Sheet for the evidence E2. Implementation of the privacy technique of noise
addition.
E2 Noise addition has been implemented
Status:
Done
Review Date:
February 2015
Weight:
8
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1
Description: A noise addition privacy-preserving scheme for smart metering has been im-
plemented. We claim that the solution meets the needs of consumers (privacy) and power
providers (utility). The modification in the communication procedure between a smart meter
and the power provider is just the generation of a random number and the addition of this
number to the measurement to be sent to the power provider.
References: Section 4.4.
3.7 Validation of PbE
To validate the effectiveness of PbE, it has been conducted four case studies, executing the
activities described here in smart energy metering, people counting, energy efficiency, and
two factor authentication applications. These are examples of applications that are growing
in numbers, and some of them may bring privacy risks, causing many people and even the
media to show distrust about them.
The main objective of these case studies is to assess the ability of PbE in producing
evidences of privacy. In order to measure the achievement of this objective, we use the Goal,
Question, Metric (GQM) paradigm [17], a mechanism for defining and evaluating goals
using measurement.
3.7.1 GQM
GQM defines a measurement model on three levels: conceptual level (Goal), operational
level (Question) and quantitative level (Metric). GQM templates are a structured way of
specifying goals. A GQM template contains the following fields: purpose, object of study,
focus, stakeholder and context.
In our validation, here is the GQM template to express the goal of our study: The purpose
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of this study is to evaluate the ability of the Privacy by Evidence methodology in helping to
produce privacy-friendly applications from the point of view of developers in the context of
the development process.
In the next sections, we conduct four case studies, therefore, four research questions were
defined to characterize the measurement objects:
• RQ1: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly smart energy metering application?
• RQ2: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly people counting application?
• RQ3: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly energy efficiency application?
• RQ4: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly two factor authentication applica-
tion?
To answer these three research questions, we use the metrics of number of provided
evidences and their sum of weights. If the development of an application is being able to
produce evidences of privacy protection, then this indicates that PbE is being helpful.
3.8 Discussion
In this chapter, we proposed the Privacy by Evidence (PbE), a novel methodology to guide
the implementation of privacy concepts when developing applications and to provide ev-
idences of privacy. PbE is in accordance with all the 7 principles defined by PbD, and
therefore, PbE may be considered as an extension of PbD. We specified a framework for the
checklist of the possible artifacts. Some of these artifacts are evidences of privacy, and we
propose to structure them using the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). In the next chapters,
we seek to validate PbE through case studies.
Chapter 4
Case Study I: Smart Metering
In this chapter, we present the first case study, a smart metering application which uses infor-
mation regarding energy consumption. Although the main objective is to validate the PbE,
we believe that the results presented in this chapter are of importance for the smart metering
area. These results were to be applied in the LiteMe1 application, a project developed by the
Smartiks2 company in partnership with the Federal University of Campina Grande (UFCG).
4.1 Context and Data Formats
Smart Grids are systems that combine the traditional power grid with modern information
technologies to enable a more efficient and robust grid. With these systems, power providers
can monitor, analyze and control the network and communicate with the consumers to im-
prove the energy quality, reduce energy consumption and cost, and maximize the trans-
parency and reliability of the energy supply chain. In this scenario, a key component on
the consumers’ side is the use of smart meters.
Smart meters are devices that measure electricity consumption in real time and transmit
this data to remote servers. These devices may represent a turning point in the energy indus-
try and foster the development of new services and improvement of existing ones. In a typical
smart metering architecture, the analysis of the collected data can help power providers to
learn how to better manage the areas within their networks. Thus, helping to understand the
1http://liteme.com.br
2http://www.smartiks.com
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Figure 4.1: Smart metering system architecture and data usage applications [100].
business benefits of investing in Smart Grids. Figure 4.1 presents a smart metering system
architecture.
Despite the benefits, smart meters raise concerns about the privacy of consumers. Elec-
tricity data may contain private sensitive information, such as which appliances are being
used, if the house is empty, when people take a shower or shut down the television. The pri-
vacy issues are some of the main reasons why smart meters were still not deployed in many
countries [55]. Clearly, there is a trade-off between utility and privacy.
As an example of the data format, Figure 4.2 shows a daily profile of a residential con-
sumer.3 Using advanced power signature analysis tools, such as the Non-Intrusive Appliance
Load Monitoring (NIALM), it is possible to find out private information about the consumer’s
lifestyle. Batra et al. [19] designed some methodologies to identify the use of appliances
from load profiles. In Figure 4.2, the appliance with highest wattage and easier to identify is
the laundry dryer. If the load monitoring algorithm is running remotely, the consumers may
not know that their behaviors are being monitored.
In a traditional industrial setting, such behavior information is not in principle useful
3Combining appliance signatures it is possible to generate arbitrary large populations and measurement
frequency. Several databases of appliance signatures are available online (e.g., Tracebase [84]).
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Figure 4.2: Residential (black solid) and Laundry Dryer (red dashed) daily profiles with
measurements at each 1 minute.
for a power provider. However, currently this type of information is of interest to many
businesses that want to identify the profile of a potential consumer of their products and
services. Therefore, disclosing such profiles and habits of consumers evokes issues about
privacy. Clear rules are needed to protect consumers from misuse of their behavioral data and
to avoid that Smart Grids become a new type of Big Brother [25]. Unfortunately, protection
laws may take decades to be applied whereas smart meters are already operational.
4.2 Norms and Legislation
Regarding the activity of checking compliance with norms and legislations for the energy
data, the Brazilian National Agency of Electrical Energy (ANEEL) establishes a normative
resolution4 with the following rule of privacy for smart metering: “In the hypothesis of a
metering system with a remote communication, the power provider has to adopt procedures
and technologies to ensure the security of the data traffic and, specially, of the collected
personal information”. In other words, this rule determines that security mechanisms such
as encryption and certification must be used.
4ANEEL, Normative Resolution No 502, Chapter III, Art. 7. www.aneel.gov.br/cedoc/
ren2012502.pdf
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In the same article, ANEEL establishes another rule: “It is forbidden for the power
provider to disclose to third parties the data collected from consumer units without autho-
rization of the owners”. These rules could help to provide some evidences of privacy, but
unfortunately they were suspended by the agency since February 11, 2014. Moreover, even
if they come back in the future, it is known that there are possibilities of external hackers to
penetrate systems (including the Meter Data Management in the power provider), or internal
malicious employees to export the data after a decryption.
Another rule5 established by ANEEL is: “The meters must have mass storage capable
of storing active and reactive energy data, demand and tension, considering the direct and
reverse flow of energy according to the usage, at programmable intervals of 5 (five) to 60
(sixty) minutes”. The granularity of 5 minutes is the important information here. This could
help to provide evidences of privacy, however it is known that NIALM algorithms can still
identify appliance usages with this granularity. Moreover, this rule is only applied to official
and regulated meters. The energy meter used by the LiteMe application is just an additional
device that does not have the goal to replace existing traditional meters. Therefore, for many
purposes, this device has the ability to collect and send data with time intervals of 1 second.
Despite the lack of norms and legislation to be applied in this application, the study and
the summary of possibilities suggest a concern for privacy in this project, generating this,
an evidence of privacy. Table 4.1 describes a sheet for this evidence E1 and Figure 4.3
presents the first part of the GSN for the privacy case of a smart metering application. This
representation is still to grow, according to the normal software evolution and our proposed
methodology. In this application context, assuming that security assurances have been taken,
there is an argument that the privacy is being preserved according to the provided evidences.
For now, there is only one evidence provided (E1).
4.3 Utilities and Risk Assessment
For the risk assessment, first we identified what is possible to do with the collected energy
data. Since individual values (such as the consumption of a house in an instant of time)
5ANEEL, PRODIST, Module 5, Section 4.1.3.1. www.aneel.gov.br/arquivos/PDF/Modulo5_
Revisao\_2.pdf
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Table 4.1: Sheet for the evidence E1. Norms and legislations for smart metering.
E1 Norms and legislations have been studied
Status:
Done
Review Date:
August 2015
Weight:
1
PbE Activity: Check Compliance with Norms and Legislation
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1
Description: Possible norms and legislations that could be applied for the smart metering appli-
cation have been studied and summarized. In Brazil, it was not found any norm or law dealing
with the collection, storage and processing of energy metering data that could affect the design
of the LiteMe application. There are norms proposed by the ANEEL, but only applied to official
and regulated meters.
References: Section 4.2.
Figure 4.3: First iteration of the construction of the GSN representation for the privacy case
of a smart metering application.
are more sensitive than aggregate values (such as the total consumption in a region with N
consumers, or the total consumption of a house in the end of a billing period), the privacy
techniques need to focus on hiding individual values.
Many utilities that use metering data were listed in Table 4.2. From this list, using a
risk binary scale, “load forecasting for individual consumers”, “individual data analytics”
and “demand-based rates” were considered as privacy threats that needed to be solved. This
classification is based on the usage of individual values. The check if a utility uses individual
values (and thus if it is a privacy risk) can be found in the references.
Unfortunately, “demand-based rates” may be a legitimate utility but regarded as a privacy
risk. Power providers would charge based on the instantaneous power, but to do that, it is
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Table 4.2: List of metering data utilities.
Feature / Benefit
Privacy
Risk?
Billing optimization [13] No
Load monitoring and management for specific groups or regions [13] No
Energy theft/losses detection [5] No
Load forecasting for specific groups or regions [49] No
Load forecasting for individual consumers [49] Yes
Time-based rates (e.g., different prices based on time of day and season) [13] No
Demand-based rates (e.g. different prices based on demand levels) [81] Yes
Individual data analytics (e.g. NIALM and marketers) [11; 73] Yes
In-home feedback tools: estimated bills, device profiles etc [105] No
necessary to know the individual measurements.
4.3.1 Adversary Model
In the smart metering privacy literature, it is common to consider the power provider as an
adversary (honest, but curious) and, transitively, the data exposure to third parties becomes a
threat to privacy too. Therefore, it is resonable to consider the power provider as an adversary
and to apply the privacy techniques on the consumers’ side [30; 41; 43; 8; 53; 65; 107;
8; 53; 65; 107]. Figure 4.4 presents the second iteration of the construction of the GSN
representation for this case study. The diagram now considers the adversary model, i.e.,
the assumption that the sensor is not an adversary and the strategy to provide mitigations
considering that the service is an adversary.
4.4 Privacy Techniques
With the considerable amount of privacy-preserving techniques that can be adopted to ensure
privacy in smart metering, the need to better understand and compare these solutions rise. In
general, there are techniques based on homomorphic encryption [30; 41; 43], the techniques
that use rechargeable batteries [8; 53; 65; 107], and the ones that make use of noise addition
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Figure 4.4: Second iteration of the construction of the GSN representation for the privacy
case of a smart metering application.
[99; 26; 47; 12]. Since the main privacy issues are derived from individual data, these privacy
preserving approaches tend to reveal aggregate data and hide individual data.
To enable power providers to process smart meter measurements, while preventing them
to access private data, cryptographic tools like homomorphic encryption may be used. With
these approaches, before sending its measurement, each smart meter runs a cryptographic
routine. The power provider receives encrypted measurements, but can still perform useful
computations and output the correct aggregate values, like the total consumption of a con-
sumer during a billing period or the total consumption in the region in an instant of time.
Thus, some benefits of using smart metering are still provided, while the consumer privacy
is maintained.
Techniques based on the usage of rechargeable batteries consist in using a battery be-
tween the smart meter and home appliances. Therefore, the disclosed information is the
battery load profile, but not the daily activities and appliance usages of consumers.
Through noise addition techniques, individual measurements are masked by adding ran-
dom numbers. This masking happens in a way that does not affect the outcome of the aggre-
gating operations but hides the individual measurements.
The privacy techniques were evaluated [14], and it was concluded that noise addition
stands out from the others. Despite the disadvantage in accuracy, it has a low complexity,
scalability, meters’ independence, low cost and low environmental impact (this one, when
compared with rechargeable batteries approach). Therefore, the next paragraphs are focused
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on the noise addition approach. Rechargeable batteries and homomorphic encryption tech-
niques are presented in Appendix B.
4.4.1 Noise Addition
Noise addition is a privacy preserving technique to mask the data. Wang et al. [99] propose
an approach to mask the data adding random numbers from a Gaussian Mixture Models
(GMM), whereas Bohli et al. [26] and He et al. [47] propose approaches to mask the data
using Gaussian noise. Noise addition is a promising and efficient technique, however, these
mentioned approaches do not have formal models to calculate the amount of noise that should
be added to guarantee desired privacy and utility levels. In fact, He et al. [47] argue that for
real world system design, a proper trade-off between privacy protection and accuracy should
be considered.
We propose that for every measurement, the smart meter reads the consumption and adds
a random number [13]. Thus, after an aggregating operation (such as the calculation of the
total consumption in a region or the total consumption of a consumer in the end of a billing
period), the result will be:
N∑
i=1
ci ≈
N∑
i=1
(ci + xi)
where N is the total number of measurements, xi is a random number generated from a
probabilistic distribution and ci is an individual consumption measurement.
The previous formalization can also be rewritten as follows:
N∑
i=1
ci =
N∑
i=1
(ci + xi) − eo
where eo is the obtained error by the addition of random numbers. Therefore, eo is the sum
of all added random values:
eo =
N∑
i=1
xi .
We developed many analytical models using probability theory for different distributions
[11]. Here we consider the Laplace distribution. Let xi be a random variable generated from
this distribution. Its variance is σ2x = 2b
2, where b is a scale parameter. Now, for a large N ,
the central limit theorem ensures that the obtained error for billing purpose follows a normal
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Figure 4.5: Residential masked daily profile with measurements at each 1 minute.
distribution with mean µeo = 0 and variance:
σ2eo = N
2(σ2x / N) = Nσ
2
x = 2Nb
2 . (4.1)
In other words, to have an obtained error between two accepted values (with high proba-
bility), we can use the following normal distribution:
eo ∼ N
(
0, 2Nb2
)
.
As an example, Figure 4.2 shows a daily profile of a residential consumer. There are
16 appliances in this consumption profile. However, the appliance with highest wattage and
easier to identify is the laundry dryer. Assuming the billing period as one month, the total
consumption of this consumer during the billing period (one month of 31 days) is 131.978
kWh. Considering a maximal allowed error of 5% for billing purpose, we have 6.5989 kWh.
Thus, the variance for a high probability (e.g., 0.98) of not exceeding this value is σ2eo =
8.04626. Isolating the scale parameter b from Equation 4.1, we have (for measurements at
each 1 minute, N = 44, 640):
b =
√
σ2eo/ (2N) = 0.0094934 .
Figure 4.5 presents the daily profile of Figure 4.2 masked using this Laplacian noise.
Considering that at the end of the month the power provider sums the informed masked
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values by the consumer, it obtains a value of 133.7977 kWh. The real value is 131.978 kWh.
The difference between these values is an error of 1.3788%, less than the maximum allowed
error (5%). This error may be less if the consumer does not mask the measurements all the
time. Also, if the meter firmware accumulates the sum of the added random numbers and
sends that with the last measurement of the month, the error is zero.
The existence of errors in applications of electrical networks are often found nowadays
(since these errors should be less than established limits). For example, in Brazil, the IN-
METRO (National Institute of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality) establishes
percentual error limits to measurements for billing purposes. For residential customers (de-
fined as class B), the percentual relative error for active energy must stay between +/- 2%,
while for industrial customers (defined as class A), this error must stay between +/-3%. For
more information see the ordinance number 375 of September 27, 2011 [50].
A key feature of the approach is the possibility to allow the consumer and the power
provider to negotiate the privacy and utility levels by just changing the allowed error/noise
magnitude. Moreover, since this masking approach considers only the data that is disclosed
to the power provider, it does not affect the customer’s ability of analyzing his own real
consumption profile inside his home and identifying appliance usage [105].
We claim that the proposed approach is lightweight [13] because in order to preserve
privacy the approach just generates a random number. Also, it is possible to provide dif-
ferential privacy [37] guarantees for appliance usages, making them indistinguishable in a
consumption profile [12].
Differential Privacy for Appliances
Dwork [37] proposed the notion of differential privacy for general datasets. A mechanism of
obfuscation is differentially private if its outcome is not significantly affected by the removal
or addition of a single dataset participant. Here, we instantiate this notion for datasets of
energy consumption profiles.
Since the privacy is related with appliance usage (i.e., the consumer behavior), we aim to
achieve differential privacy for appliances in metering data without affecting the aggregate
data. Thus, appliances are participants in consumption profiles and an adversary learns ap-
proximately the same information about any individual appliance, regardless of its presence
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or absence in the original profile.
Considering that a consumption profile is a set of appliances, we say profiles P1 and P2
differ in at most one appliance if one is a proper subset of the other and the larger dataset
profile contains just one additional appliance.
Definition 3 An obfuscation mechanism K gives -differential privacy if for all profiles P1
and P2 differing in at most one appliance, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(P1) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[K(P2) ∈ S]
where the probability is taken over the randomness of K.
The  value is the privacy metric and for better privacy, a small value is desirable. A
mechanism K satisfying this definition addresses concerns that any appliance might have
about the leakage of its information: even if the appliance has been removed from the
dataset, no outputs (and thus consequences of outputs) would become significantly more
or less likely.
Differential privacy is achieved by the addition of noise whose magnitude is a function
of the largest change a single appliance could have on the output profile; this quantity is
referred as the sensitivity of the function.
Definition 4 For f : P → Rk, the sensitivity of f is
∆f = max
P1,P2
‖ f(P1)− f(P2) ‖1
for all P1, P2 differing in at most one appliance.
In particular, when k = 1 the sensitivity of f is the maximum difference in the values
that the function f may take on a pair of profiles that differ in only one appliance.
The privacy mechanism, denoted K for a query function f , computes f(X) and adds
noise with a Laplace distribution with mean µ = 0 and scale parameter b:
b = ∆f/ ∴  = ∆f/b . (4.2)
The variance of the noise distribution is 2b2. On query function f the privacy mechanism
K responds with
f(X) + (Lap(∆f/))k
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adding noise with distribution Lap(∆f/) independently to each of the k components of
f(X). Note that decreasing , a publicly known parameter, flattens out the Lap(∆f/)
curve, yielding larger expected noise magnitude.
Theorem 1 For f : P → Rk, the mechanism K that adds independently noise with distri-
bution Lap(∆f/) gives -differential privacy.
The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward and Dwork gives this proof for general
datasets in [38]. This theorem describes a relationship between ∆f , b, and the differential
privacy. To achieve -differential privacy, one must choose b ≥ ∆f/. Given a sufficiently
small , differential privacy limits the ability of an adversary to identify an appliance in the
consumption profile.
Note that it is not hard for a user (or an automated mechanism) to identify the wattage of
an appliance purchased. That said, the global sensitivity of the profile from Figure 4.2 is the
maximum variation of the appliance with highest wattage (laundry dryer):
∆f = 0.01022 .
We can conclude that, from Equation 4.2, using an utility requirement of 5%, the
achieved privacy level in this example is:
 =
∆f
b
= 1.077 .
In the literature of differential privacy, some researchers argue that the value of  may
be relative because for the same value of , the probability of identifying a participant is
dependent on the context. Lee et al. [59] propose a technique to, in accordance with a
context, find a suitable value of :
 =
∆f
∆v
ln
(n− 1)p
1− p (4.3)
where ∆v is the largest distance of possible values, p is the probability of identifying the
presence of an individual and n is the number of individuals in the data set. In the previous
example for the consumption profile, we have ∆v = 0.0178 (highest value presented in
the profile) and n = 16 (number of appliances). Thus, considering that the probability of
identifying the usage of an appliance is 1/3, it is suggested to have:
 ≤ 0.01022
0.0178
ln
15 · 3
3 · 2 = 1.1568 .
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Since in our example the obtained value of  is 1.077, we can conclude that an attacker
has a probability of identifying the laundry dryer less than 1/3. In other words, on average,
he/she has to try more than three moments to be able to guess one moment of usage of the
laundry dryer (and maybe he/she does not know that).
Rearranging Equation 4.3, we can determine the probability:
p =
1
1 + (n− 1) · exp(− ∆v
∆f
)
. (4.4)
In Table 4.3 we present the wattages and achieved privacy levels for some appliances
of the profile from the previous example. The wattages were obtained from the Tracebase
dataset [84], the  values were obtained from Equation 4.2, and the probability values of
identifying appliances were obtained from Equation 4.4.
As discussed before, lower values of  or p imply better privacy. Naturally, the consumer
behavior and privacy are correlated with the appliance usage and some of these information
may be more sensitive than others.
As we can see in Table 4.3, the appliance wattage is very correlated with the privacy
level. However, some appliances with higher wattage have better privacy than some appli-
ances with lower wattage. This is because the accumulated consumption (kWh) is not only
dependent on the wattage, but also on the time of use of the appliance.
It is known that less measurements implies higher privacy. Taking an extreme example, if
a consumer sends to the power provider only one measurement with the total consumption at
the end of the billing period, the achieved privacy is much better than sending measurements
at each 1 minute. However, when the number of measurements in a time period is large,
our approach generates noise to hide each individual measurement, and the achieved privacy
could be as higher as sending only one measurement with the total consumption at the end
of the billing period.
Using the proposed model, it is also possible to calculate the achieved utility level for a
given privacy requirement. From Equation (4.1) and (4.2) we have:
σ2eo =
2 ·N ·∆f 2
2
. (4.5)
Therefore, with this variation, the maximum obtained error (utility level) is easily calcu-
lated using the inverse cumulative density function (quantiles) of the normal distribution.
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Table 4.3: Privacy levels achieved for each appliance from the profile of Fig. 4.2. Lower
values of  and p imply better privacy.
Appliance Max. Wattage Privacy () Probability (p)
Charger Smartphone ∼6 0.001 0.0626
Router ∼9 0.003 0.0628
Playstation 3 ∼130 0.037 0.0663
TV LCD ∼140 0.075 0.0706
PC Desktop ∼300 0.077 0.0708
Refrigerator ∼1000 0.099 0.0733
Printer ∼600 0.127 0.0767
Water Fountain ∼260 0.143 0.0787
Toaster ∼700 0.257 0.0944
Cooking Stove ∼900 0.276 0.0973
Vacuum Cleaner ∼1100 0.336 0.1068
Iron ∼1500 0.347 0.1087
Coffee Maker ∼1300 0.353 0.1097
Microwave Oven ∼1400 0.457 0.1287
Washing Machine ∼3000 0.903 0.2431
Laundry Dryer ∼3500 1.077 0.3031
Example of Load Monitoring in a Region
If each consumer masks his data based on the billing period, the power provider may obtain
accurate values for billing. However, to obtain accurate values for load monitoring in a
region, the number of consumers should be as many as possible because it is desired that the
added noise should be unnoticed in the aggregated data used for load monitoring.
The data used in the next example are measurements collected at each 30 minutes from
real residential consumers (anonymised) from Ireland (Commission for Energy Regulation –
CER) [32]. Suppose that the power provider wants to compute the total consumption in a
region with many consumers through time for load monitoring (e.g., find peak times, leak
detection, load forecasting and many other applications). Using a billing period of 1 month
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Figure 4.6: Regional profile using original data (blue solid) versus using masked data (red
dashed) with measurements of 30 min. The profiles are very similar.
and measurements at each 30 minutes, it has N = 1488 measurements for each consumer
during a month with 31 days (March). So, in this experiment, we consider a region with
1488 consumers (thus, the data forms a square matrix). Figure 4.6 shows the regional profile
during March obtained from original consumer profiles versus the regional profile obtained
from masked profiles.
As depicted in Figure 4.6, visually there is no difference between the two profiles. How-
ever, the obtained errors depend on the population behavior. For example, in a high con-
sumption period the obtained error has a different proportion from the obtained error in a
low consumption period. The large errors in Figure 4.6 were obtained in periods of low con-
sumption (e.g., during the night), because while consuming less, consumers are still masking
their data using a noise level based on the billing period. The blue dashed line in Figure 4.7
presents the obtained errors through time for this scenario (Figure 4.6). These errors may be
lower if not all consumers decide to mask their data all the time.
The possibility of having consumers deciding when to send masked (vs. original) mea-
surements is in accordance with the privacy definition mentioned by Stallings et al. [92] and
can be implemented through a privacy switch (i.e., enable or disable the masking). As not
all consumers are masking the measurements all the time (making the obtained error to be
lower), this implies in a utility improvement.
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Figure 4.7: Obtained errors for the regional profile using masked profiles versus using filtered
profiles. Using filtered profiles implies in better accuracy for load monitoring.
4.4.2 Performance Evaluation of Privacy Techniques
In order to analyze and compare solutions, we describe the performance aspects that are
considered in our studies. This analysis is important because, for example, solutions might
excel at low computational complexity but their installation and usage has high costs and
harms the environment. Thus, the need to consider different aspects of performance. In
this section, we present an experiment that aims to compare the response time (which is
related to computational complexity) of the approaches. We also discuss other aspects, such
as: scalability, meters’ independence, cost, environmental impact and accuracy. Table 4.4
presents a summary and comparison of the discussed approaches.
Computational Complexity
Low complexity is desired mainly because most of the deployed smart meters are low-cost
microcontrollers and with limited computational resources. Through the analysis of the so-
lutions’ running time growth order, we have the complexities presented in Table 4.5. We
consider that, regarding computational complexity, the noise addition and rechargeable bat-
teries approaches stand in relation to the homomorphic encryption approaches.
Although estimation through asymptotic complexity is a good way to estimate computa-
tional complexity, we claim that experimental analysis is essential to present concrete results
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Table 4.4: Comparison of the privacy perserving approaches in smart metering.
NA RB HE
Low complexity 3 3
Scalability 3 3
Meters’ independence 3 3
Low cost 3 3
Low environmental impact 3 3
Accuracy 3 3
Legend:
• NA: Noise Addition [11];
• RB: Rechargeable Batteries [65];
•HE: Homomorphic Encryption [30; 43; 41];
when comparing different proposals. Therefore, we implemented simulators6 in the C pro-
gramming language. These simulators make use of a few functions from the libgmp7, lib-
paillier8 and libcrypto9 libraries to implement algorithms that mimic the protocols described
in this chapter and in Appendix B. The simulators were executed in a machine with 1.6 GHz
Intel Core i5 processor, 6 GB of RAM memory and the Ubuntu 14.04 operating system.
In our simulations, using different configuration scenarios (number of meters, ranging
from 1 to 200) to calculate the total consumption in the region, we measured the processing
time of each meter (Figure 4.8) and the aggregator (Figure 4.9).
Each scenario was executed 10 times and the average values were considered. This
amount of repetitions were enough to get precise average values. Due to the very low ob-
tained variations, the confidence intervals are being omitted here, except for the aggregation
in the approach proposed by Busom et al. [30], which needs a trial and error mechanism to
solve the discrete logarithm problem. The confidence intervals in these cases are of 95%.
6The source codes can be found at our GitHub repository (https://git.lsd.ufcg.edu.br/
pedroysb/privacy-performance-smart-metering/tree/master).
7libgmp: https://gmplib.org
8libpaillier: http://acsc.cs.utexas.edu/libpaillier
9libcrypto: https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/crypto/crypto.html
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Table 4.5: Complexity analysis for different privacy preserving approaches in smart meter-
ing.
NA RB MEE PESS MPE
Operation SM AG SM AG SM AG SM AG SM AG
Encryption - - - - O(1) - O(N) - O(1) -
Decryption - - - - - O(M) O(1) - O(1) -
Transmission O(1) O(N) O(1) O(N) O(1) O(N) O(N) O(N2) O(N) -
Sum O(1) O(N) O(1) O(N) - - O(1) O(N) O(N) -
Product - - - - - O(N) - O(N2) O(N) -
Legend:
• NA: Noise Addition [11];
• RB: Rechargeable Batteries [65];
•MEE: Modified ElGamal Encryption [30];
• PESS: Paillier Encryption and Secret Sharing [43];
•MPE: Modified Paillier Encryption [41];
• SM: Smart Meter;
• AG: Aggregator;
• N: Number of consumption measurements;
•M: Total (aggregate) consumption value.
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Figure 4.8: Processing time of smart meters in 5 different privacy preserving approaches.
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Figure 4.9: Processing time of the aggregator in 5 different privacy preserving approaches.
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From these measurements, we conclude that the noise addition approach and the one that
uses rechargeable batteries presented very low response times, whereas the homomorphic
encryption approaches presented considerable delays. It is also important to note that there
are many message exchanges in the homomorphic encryption approaches, but we are not
considering possible network delays in our experiments.
Cost and Environmental Impact
As mentioned, usage of rechargeable batteries can help to diminish many privacy issues.
Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore the environmental effects and the costs of using batteries.
Mclaughlin et al. [65] stipulate that a lead-acid battery of 50 Ah which operates at 12 V may
cost approximately $100, and to achieve a typical residential nominal voltage of 120 V it is
required 10 of such batteries (aprox. $1,000). The lifetime of each battery is approximately
two years. Therefore, these solutions can not be considered low cost and cause a high en-
vironmental impact. Noise addition and homomorphic encryption approaches do not have
these limitations.
Meters’ Independence and Scalability
In order to exchange randomly generated numbers, keys and secret shares, the homomor-
phic encryption protocols require communication between meters and/or the power provider.
Some solutions even require a large distribution of keys and certification. For this reason, in
these approaches, the meters are not independent. This overhead can be the bottleneck of the
smart metering system. Hence, actually optimizing communication at the meters is a hard
task that has not been fully addressed in homomorphic encryption approaches. Addition-
ally, if one meter fails in any message exchange, the aggregation may become impossible
because it requires computations using all distributed keys or secret shares. Therefore, these
solutions may raise scalability issues when used in an area with a large number of meters.
Noise addition and rechargeable batteries approaches do not have these limitations.
Accuracy
As mentioned, noise addition masks the data and introduces some error in an aggregation
operation. This error is controlled and usually smaller than an acceptable value. Also, allow-
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ing the enabling or disabling of masking would make errors smaller in both dimensions: for
billing, since a consumer would not mask all the time, and for load monitoring in a region,
since not all consumers would mask in an instant of time. However, the noise addition pri-
vacy preserving approach is still not considered one hundred percent accurate. In the case of
Section 4.4.1, the use of noise will introduce errors in the billing reports. These errors tend to
be cancelled over time, but there is a probability that a higher value can occur. Rechargeable
batteries and homomorphic encryption approaches do not have this limitation.
4.4.3 Discussion
We reviewed five solutions, one based on the use of noise addition, other based on the use
of rechargeable batteries and three others based on homomorphic encryption schemes. We
evaluated these approaches considering the main needed performance aspects and conclude
that each solution has its advantages and disadvantages, but the noise addition stands out
with relation to the others. Therefore, we choose to implement the noise addition in the
LiteMe system.
To validate the utility, many utilities or benefits that use metering data were listed and
evaluated to check whether they are still supported when using masked data. Since the noise
addition approach preserves the aggregated values, the procedure to check if a feature is
supported can be mapped as a checking if the feature uses only aggregated values or also
uses individual values.
Table 4.6 presents the list from Table 4.2 but with an additional column (supported or
not). The check if a utility uses only aggregated values (and thus if it is supported) can
be found in the references. From the features that are not supported, “load forecasting for
individual consumers” and “individual data analytics” can be considered as privacy threats
that were solved. Since the approach masks the profile using noise addition, the individual
demand or consumption levels are not original and the feature “demand-based rates” is not
supported. Therefore, if the power provider wants to use this feature, it will see this as a
limitation.
We implemented the noise addition approach as a privacy switch in the smart meter,
as presented in Figure 4.10. There are many components in this sensor, however the most
important ones are:
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Table 4.6: Metering data utilities and the masking impact.
Feature / Benefit
Privacy
Risk?
Support
Billing optimization [13] No 3
Load monitoring and management for specific groups or regions [13] No 3
Energy theft/losses detection [5] No 3
Load forecasting for specific groups or regions [49] No 3
Load forecasting for individual consumers [49] Yes
Time-based rates (e.g., different prices based on time of day and season) [13] No 3
Demand-based rates (e.g. different prices based on demand levels) [81] Yes
Individual data analytics (e.g. NIALM and marketers) [11; 73] Yes
In-home feedback tools: estimated bills, device profiles etc [105] No 3
1. ACS712: Hall-Effect-Based Linear Current Sensor. Able to measure AC/DC current
up to 30A.
2. Switching power supply: Set as 220V input and 3.3V output - 1A.
3. CS5490: IC of power management. Two channels used for current and voltage. 4kHz
sampling rate and 24 bit resolution. Calculates powers (active, reactive and apparent),
power factor, peak and RMS values.
4. Voltage transformer: Set as 220V primary and 12V secondary.
5. ESP8266: WiFi module with memory (512KB flash storage) and processing capacity
(80MHz CPU), GPIOs and ADC converter (not being used).
6. Privacy switch: Allows enabling/disabling the data masking mechanism.
Our focus here is the privacy switch (number 6). This privacy implementation is in ac-
cordance with the privacy definition mentioned by Stallings et al. [92]. When the switch
is in the disabled position, the meter sends to the remote server the original power mea-
surements. If the switch is in the enabled position, the meter sends to the remote server
masked measurements. The pseudorandom number generator used in this implementation
uses /dev/urandom, which is considered cryptographically secure [1].
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Figure 4.10: LiteMe sensor device.
The implementation of the noise addition technique consists in an evidence of privacy.
Table 4.7 describes a sheet for this evidence E2. Since the evaluation and choice of the
best evaluated techniques increase the confidence, we also have the evidence of privacy E3,
regarding the comparison of the privacy techniques, as presented in Table 4.8. The imple-
mented noise addition approach provides differential privacy for appliances, as described in
Section 4.4.1. Therefore, there is another evidence of privacy, E4, as described in the sheet
of Table 4.9.
Figure 4.11 presents the third iteration of the construction of the GSN representation for
this case study. The diagram now contains the representation of the evidences E2, E3 and
E4.
4.5 Potential Attacks
We evaluated three types of privacy attacks to the noise addition approach. The first is
a filtering attack, based on the calculation of moving arithmetic means throughout the con-
sumption profile. The second evaluated attack is a Non-Intrusive Appliance Load Monitoring
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Table 4.7: Sheet for the evidence E2. Implementation of the privacy technique of noise
addition.
E2 Noise addition has been implemented
Status:
Done
Review Date:
February 2015
Weight:
8
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: A noise addition privacy-preserving scheme for smart metering has been im-
plemented. We claim that the solution meets the needs of consumers (privacy) and power
providers (utility). The modification in the communication procedure between a smart meter
and the power provider is just the generation of a random number and the addition of this
number to the measurement to be sent to the power provider.
References: Section 4.4.
Table 4.8: Sheet for the evidence E3. Performance evaluation of different privacy tech-
niques.
E3
Homomorphic encryption, rechargeable batteries
and noise addition techniques have been evaluated
Status:
Done
Review Date:
August 2015
Weight:
2
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Five solutions have been reviewed. One based on the use of noise addition, other
based on the use of rechargeable batteries and three others based on homomorphic encryption
schemes. These approaches have been evaluated considering the main needed performance as-
pects. Each solution has its advantages and disadvantages, but the noise addition stands in relation
to the others. Due the simplicity and low complexity, the noise addition approach can be deployed
in low-cost microcontrollers.
References: Section 4.4.2, [14].
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Table 4.9: Sheet for the evidence E4. Differential privacy for appliance usages.
E4
The approach provides differential privacy for
appliances
Status:
Done
Review Date:
August 2015
Weight:
8
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Since the inference of the consumer behavior may be a privacy concern and it is
very correlated with appliance usage, the privacy levels achieved by appliances are measured
through the state of the art in privacy model (i.e., differential privacy). Differential privacy is
a recent area of research that brings mathematical rigor to the problem of privacy-preserving
analysis of data. Informally, the definition stipulates that any appliance should be indistinguish-
able in the disclosed masked consumption profile. Thus, an attacker cannot learn anything re-
garding appliances on the disclosed profile, even in the presence of any auxiliary information
the attacker may have.
References: Section 4.4, [12].
(NIALM). Finally, the third attack is based on the hypothesis that a consumer tends to have
a similar weekly behavior and, therefore, the attacker may collect the consumer’s data and
calculate an expected week for this consumer.
4.5.1 Filtering Attack
In this section we present a filtering attack. It is based on the calculation of moving arithmetic
means throughout the profile. The algorithm for the filtering attack works as follows:
• Let T be a time series, which represents the masked profile and Tf a new series (the
resulting filtered profile).
• The first P values from Tf will be equal to the first P values of T and the last P values
from Tf will be equal to the last P values of T .
• The value with index P + 1 from Tf will be the mean of the values with indexes from
1 to 2P + 1 from T . The value with index P + 2 will be the mean of the values with
indexes from 2 to 2P + 2 from T , and so on for all remaining values. This procedure
creates moveable means to eliminate the high-frequency noise.
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Figure 4.11: Third iteration of the construction of the GSN representation for the privacy
case of a smart metering application.
To analyze the attack effectiveness, we made experiments to verify if the Pearson corre-
lation coefficient10 between the original profile and the masked profile is increased after the
filtering. For example, using the masked profile from Figure 4.5, we verified if the added
noise is removed and if the correlation with the original profile is increased. As presented in
Table 4.10, we made this procedure using different P values. In this example, the configura-
tion which presented best result was P = 30.
As observed in Table 4.10, the effectiveness of filtering is increased when we increment
the P value because the high frequency noise is increasingly eliminated. In fact, the corre-
lation between the masked profile and the original profile is 0.2135, whereas filtering with
10The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of the linear dependence between two variables. It has a
value between +1 and -1 inclusive, where 1 is total positive linear correlation, 0 is no linear correlation, and -1
is total negative linear correlation.
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Table 4.10: Filtering effect using different values of P . In this example, P = 30 is the best
value.
P Correlation P Correlation
0 0.2135 29 0.7363
2 0.4154 30 0.7368
4 0.5101 31 0.7362
8 0.6149 32 0.7351
16 0.6859 256 0.4164
P = 30 we obtain a correlation of 0.7368. In other words, we can consider that this attack
has some effect on privacy. However, the attacker may not know which P value to choose
and if the chosen one is greater than 30, the obtained correlation is dwindled due the filtering
saturation. In this example, choosing P values greater than 30, the filter will eliminate not
only the added noise, but also the original characteristics of the profile.
Experiments also showed that coarse-grained measurements (with longer time intervals)
implies less filtering efficiency. This is because each measurement becomes less correlated
with the adjacent measurements. For the same consumer of the previous example, the Figure
4.12 presents the mean of the best values of P (vertical axis) for different granularity of
measurements (horizontal axis). As observed for this consumer, using measurement intervals
of 36 minutes (or greater) will make filtering attacks ineffective because the best setting is
using a P equals to 0 (i.e, no filtering). This means that with a granularity greater than or
equals to 36 minutes, the original profile is more correlated with the masked profile than
with the filtered profile. Therefore, after evaluating the experimental results of the filtering
attack, we considered this attack as unsuccessful, and we have the evidence of privacy E5,
as presented in the sheet of Table 4.11.
4.5.2 NIALM
We also performed some NIALM attacks and the results were evaluated. Figure 4.13 presents
the workflow of this testing procedure. The noise addition approach is applied in the green
task, whereas in the orange boxes, we applied the Improved NIALM using load DIvision and
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Figure 4.12: Filtering parameter (P ) for different measurement granularities. The confidence
intervals are of 95%.
Table 4.11: Sheet for the evidence E5. Resilience to the filtering attack.
E5 The approach is resilient to the filtering attack
Status:
Done
Review Date:
June 2015
Weight:
3
PbE Activity: Evaluate Potential attacks
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Experiments were conducted and the filtering attack was considered as unsuccess-
ful. The attacker may not know which parameters to choose and the filtering may be saturated.
Choosing a wrong parameter value, the filter will eliminate not only the added noise, but also
the original characteristics of the profile.
References: Section 4.5.1, [12].
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Calibration (INDIC) algorithm [18].
Figure 4.13: Workflow for privacy validation through NIALM attacks.
Figure 4.14 presents a weekly profile obtained from the popular REDD dataset [56]. In
this profile, there are many appliances being used, such as a microwave and a refrigerator.
Figure 4.15 presents the real disaggregated microwave profile. A microwave was chosen as
an example because in this profile it is a very characteristic appliance and one of the most
difficult to be hidden (since it has many peak variations).
After applying the INDIC algorithm to perform NIALM on the profile from Figure 4.14,
the appliances were disaggregated. Figure 4.16 presents the predicted microwave profile. As
observed, this predicted profile is very similar with the real microwave profile (at least the
peak moments and levels are almost the same).
We applied our noise addition approach and using an allowed error of (ea) of 5% to mask
the aggregated profile from Figure 4.14, the masked profile from Figure 4.17 was obtained.
Because negative demand values are impossible and NIALM tools can not work with that, we
vertically shifted the profile to perform the NIALM attack. This modification was simply the
addition of the absolute minimum value to every measurement of the profile, i.e., ∀c ∈ P ,
we made c = c + |min(P )|, where P is the profile and c is an individual measurement. For
the NIALM algorithm, this procedure should be the same as considering that an appliance
which demands |min(P )| was always on usage.
After applying the same INDIC algorithm to perform the NIALM, we observed that the
technique lost significantly its ability to detect appliance usages. Figure 4.18 presents the
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Figure 4.14: Example week obtained from the REDD dataset (measurements are at each 1
minute).
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Figure 4.15: Real disaggregated microwave obtained from profile of Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.16: Disaggregated microwave predicted by INDIC over profile of Figure 4.14.
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Figure 4.17: Aggregated profile of Figure 4.14 masked using ea of 5%.
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predicted microwave profile by the INDIC algorithm applied on the masked profile from
Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.18: Disaggregated microwave predicted by INDIC over the masked profile of Figure
4.17.
To evaluate the potential of NIALM approaches in detecting appliance usages, Batra et al.
[18] use two metrics: Mean Normalized Error (MNE) and Root Mean Square Error (RMS).
Lower values of MNE and RMS imply in better accuracy of the NIALM. Using different con-
figurations, we evaluated the masking approach for the two most significant appliances of the
profile from Figure 4.14, as presented in Table 4.12 and Table 4.13. As observed, even using
a high utility level and a low obfuscation (choosing a small ea), the noise addition approach
still affects significantly the NIALM potential to detect appliance usages (the MNE and RMS
values are increased significantly). Therefore, we consider this attack as unsuccessful, and
we have the evidence of privacy E6, as presented in the sheet of Table 4.14.
4.5.3 Weekly Behavior Attack
This attack is based on the hypothesis that the consumer tends to have a similar weekly
behavior (expected week). An expected week is composed by the seven expected days (from
Sunday to Saturday), and an expected day is composed by the averages of each instant of time
from this specific day (e.g., the attacker calculates the expected Sunday from all available
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Table 4.12: MNE values by INDIC using different masking configurations (no masking,
masking with allowed error of 1%, 2% and 5%).
Appliance No Masking ea = 1% ea = 2% ea = 5%
Microwave 70.89 225.69 2976.94 6768.89
Refrigerator 28.09 248.31 247.59 278.4
Table 4.13: RMS values by INDIC using different masking configurations (no masking,
masking with allowed error of 1%, 2% and 5%).
Appliance No Masking ea = 1% ea = 2% ea = 5%
Microwave 54.16 193.47 649.45 495.72
Refrigerator 70.17 143.34 216.79 189.67
Table 4.14: Sheet for the evidence E6. Resilience to the NIALM attack.
E6 The approach is resilient to the NIALM attack
Status:
Done
Review Date:
June 2015
Weight:
3
PbE Activity: Evaluate Potential attacks
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Experiments were conducted and it was concluded that even using a high utility
level and a low obfuscation (choosing a small ea), the noise addition approach still affects
significantly the potential of INDIC (a NIALM algorithm) in detecting appliance usages.
References: Section 4.5.2, [11].
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Number of available Average correlation between Average correlation between
weeks to the attacker masked and real weeks the expected and real weeks
2 (0,499; 0,510) (-0,046; -0,033)
4 (0,335; 0,344) (-0,005; 0,004)
8 (0,369; 0,374) (0,154; 0,166)
16 (0,326; 0,331) (0,171; 0,180)
32 (0,436; 0,439) (0,182; 0,189)
52 (0,432; 0,434) (0,316; 0,323)
Table 4.15: Effect of the attack of the similar weekly behavior for a residential consumer.
Sundays). Using the expected week, the attacker can try to predict the consumer behavior in
future weeks. The attack effect is dependent on the amount of data available to the attacker.
From the CER dataset (real residential consumers of Ireland), we selected a consumer
who always repeats his/her behavior and considered in our experiments. The results are
presented in Table 4.15. The average Pearson correlation between masked weeks and real
weeks was compared versus the average Pearson correlation between the expected week and
real weeks to analyze the attack effect. We used confidence intervals with significance levels
of 95%.
As it can be seen in Table 4.15, when the number of weeks available to the attacker
increases, the attack effect increases also, because the correlation between the expected week
and real weeks is higher. But for our experiments, even choosing a consumer who repeats
a behavior almost always and using a long period of observation (52 weeks or a full year),
these correlations are less than the correlations between masked weeks and real weeks. It
means that it is better to guess the consumer behavior from the own masked week than from
the expected week. Therefore, we considered this attack as unsuccessful, and we have the
evidence of privacy E7, as presented in the sheet of Table 4.16.
After performing the attacks and providing the evidences E5, E6 and E7, the GSN rep-
resentation was expanded to the one presented in Figure 4.19.
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Table 4.16: Sheet for the evidence E7. Resilience to the similar weekly behavior attack.
E7
The approach is resilient to the similar weekly
behavior attack
Status:
Done
Review Date:
June 2015
Weight:
3
PbE Activity: Evaluate Potential attacks
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G3→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Experiments were conducted and it was concluded that even for a consumer who
repeats a behavior almost always and using a long period of observation (52 weeks or a full
year), the correlations between the expected week and the real weeks are less than the correla-
tions between masked weeks and real weeks. It means that it is better to guess the consumer
behavior from the own masked week than from the expected week and therefore, the approach
is considered as resilient to this attack.
References: Section 4.5.3, [13].
Figure 4.19: Fourth iteration of the construction of the GSN representation for the privacy
case of a smart metering application.
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Table 4.17: Checklist of the artifacts produced in the smart metering case study.
Activity Artifact Supplied?
Identify the Application Context and Data Formats
Engagement Report 3
Datasets 3
Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Summary of Norms 3
Implementation of Norms 3
Compliance Proofs 3
Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Utilities List 3
Perception Questionnaires
Perception Report
Privacy Concerns 3
Adversary Model 3
Privacy Policy
Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Summary of Techniques 3
Techniques Report 3
Implementation of Techniques 3
New Utilities List 3
Evaluate Potential Attacks
Summary of Attacks 3
Attack Scripts 3
Attacks Report 3
4.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we validated the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) methodology through a case
study of a smart metering application. Table 4.17 shows the checklist with the collected
artifacts in this case study. We did not conduct any perception study in the risk assessment,
however, in the next chapters, we present examples of such studies.
Figure 4.19 presented the GSN for the privacy case of a smart metering application con-
sidering the mentioned adversary model. This representation is still to grow, according to the
normal software evolution and our proposed methodology. In this application context, as-
suming that security assurances have been taken and thay the sensor is not an adversary, there
is an argument that the privacy is being preserved according to the provided evidences. Ev-
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ery evidence has an identification to enable the traceability into the corresponding artifacts.
There are other smart energy meter solutions such as OPower11 and Eyedro12, however, we
claim that LiteMe is the first application to consider techniques to preserve users’ privacy.
After validating the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) through a case study of a smart metering
application, we conclude that this methodology can be regarded as an effective way to imple-
ment privacy protections mechanism. Seven privacy evidences were provided and the sum
of their weights results in 28. Therefore, we positively support the research question RQ1.
It is important to note that such mitigations must be an iterative work, and thus the stages in
the methodology must happen in a constant cycle, once new risks can always be detected.
11Opower, opower.com
12Eyedro, eyedro.com
Chapter 5
Case Study II: Pulso Application
In this chapter, we present the second case study, the Pulso application. This application
uses information regarding people tracking in public places, and therefore, may bring many
privacy concerns. The Pulso application is a project developed by the Federal University of
Campina Grande (UFCG) in partnership with the Hewlett Packard1 (HP) company.
5.1 Context and Data Formats
Pulso is a mobile application that helps people to obtain information about public places.
When it comes to the features, Pulso shows the estimated number of people in the place,
the forecast of people that will be at this place in the next hours and also the “familiar
faces” feature, that indicates the people a user may know, from the amount of times that two
individuals were in the same place in the past. Figure 5.1 presents two screens of the Pulso
application.
For the data collection, there are sensors (common access points, with modified
firmwares) which retrieve probe requests from WiFi signals of mobile phones. The data
flow is as follows:
1. The mobile phone sends broadcast packets, scanning for nearby WiFi networks;
2. A sensor catches these packets, which contain the media access control (MAC) ad-
dresses of the mobile phone, and sends them to a remote service/database;
1http://www.hp.com
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Figure 5.1: Two screens of the Pulso application.
3. The service processes the data and provides an Application Programming Interface
(API). The Pulso application can retrieve the data by querying from this API and pre-
senting it on the screen.
As it can be noticed, the Pulso application may generate many useful utilities but also
some privacy concerns. If the wrong person has access to the data, sensitive information,
like who was where, when, and with whom, is compromised. We analysed many samples
of the collected data by the Pulso application. Basically, the collected data are tuples in the
form < sensor_id,mac_address, timestamp >, where the sensor_id attribute also refers
to the monitored place.
5.2 Norms and Legislation
In Brazil, we did not find any law dealing with the collection, storage and processing of
people tracking data2. From these laws, the most important ones are the Marco Civil da
2Full report of laws: https://drive.google.com/open?id=
0By4xbln0HFnRNll5ckVJcWpPYjQ
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Internet3 (law 12.965/2014) and the Projeto de Lei de Proteção de Dados Pessoais4 (law
project 5276/2016). These laws are regarding data collection through the usage of Internet
connections. From our interpretation of the Marco Civil da Internet, its main purpose is to
regulate the relationship between Internet providers and consumers. Pulso collects data of
presence/absence of people in public places in an local manner, not from the Internet.
The HP company defines its own norms, according to their experience in the market
and their ethical principles, when manipulating Personally Identifiable Information - PII.
However, the stakeholders of the project defined the Pulso application as a product of the
UFCG, and therefore, it does not need to follow the norms established by HP.
Despite the lack of norms and legislation to be applied in this application of IoT, the study
and the summary of possibilities suggest a concern for privacy in this project, consisting in
an evidence of privacy. Table 5.1 describes a sheet for this evidence E1.
Table 5.1: Sheet for the evidence E1. Norms and legislations for Pulso application.
E1 Norms and legislations have been studied
Status:
Done
Review Date:
November 2016
Weight:
1
PbE Activity: Check Compliance with Norms and Legislation
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: We studied and summarized possible norms and legislations that could be applied
for the Pulso application. In Brazil, we did not find any norm or law dealing with the collection,
storage and processing of people tracking data that could affect the design of the application.
There are norms regarding data collection through the usage of internet applications, but it is
not the case of Pulso.
References: Section 5.2.
5.3 Utilities and Risk Assessment
For the risk assessment in the smart metering case study (Section 4.3), we did not conduct
any privacy perception study with possible users of the application. However, our method-
3http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2014/lei/l12965.htm
4http://www.camara.gov.br/proposicoesWeb/prop_mostrarintegra?codteor=
1457459
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ology suggests this activity for better understanding the risks and to build an application in
accordance with the users perception of privacy. Therefore, for the case study of the Pulso
application, we focus on this activity. The following subsection were from an analysis car-
ried out in collaboration with Lesandro Ponciano, a human computation researcher, about
the perception study.
5.3.1 Privacy Perception Study
We organized the privacy perception study into five dimensions that represent perspectives
in which it is possible to approach users privacy, which are: 1) people’s general perceptions,
concerns, and beliefs; 2) data collection; 3) information inference; 4) information use trade-
offs; and 5) information exchange [80]. In order to assess people’s privacy perceptions and
concerns towards the Pulso system, we built a survey with a set of questions derived from
these five dimensions. To consider the users perception in the design of the system consists
in an evidence of privacy, as presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Sheet for the evidence E2. A privacy perception study of the Pulso application.
E2 A privacy perception study has been conducted
Status:
Done
Review Date:
November 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: For the Pulso application, we conducted a privacy perception study with a survey
considering five dimensions that represent perspectives in which it is possible to approach users
privacy in IoT systems, which are: 1) people’s general perceptions, concerns, and beliefs; 2) data
collection; 3) information inference; 4) information use trade-offs; and 5) information exchange.
58 people answered the survey and the results have been considered into the design of the Pulso
application.
References: Section 5.3.1, [80].
The context of the system was explained to the respondents by presenting screens of the
application and a video prototype showing how the system works – the used video prototype
is available at https://youtu.be/Sx_XORwpAbk. The survey was designed by using
Google Forms tools; the form is currently retired and permanently available at https:
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//goo.gl/forms/2HpdQmvg9uHCL86f1. Before the application of the survey, a pilot
test was conducted with 21 respondents in order to identify and to fix problems.
After validating the survey in the pilot test, answers from participants were collected in a
transportation hub in Campina Grande, Brazil. For each respondent, it was presented a tablet
with access to the survey. They answered the survey individually, without any external in-
terference. To sum up, 58 people answered the survey, being 38 (66%) female and 20 (34%)
male respondents, aging mostly between 25 and 34 years old (36, 65.5%). Most of them
completed high school (27, 46.6%) or under-graduation (27, 46.6%). The detailed results
obtained from the survey, considering the five defined dimensions, are presented below.
General perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes
Summary of the results: Most participants (35, 60.3%) believe that privacy is a right
guaranteed by law. Also, most participants (36, 62.1%) tend to provide the information
requested by the system if it explains its privacy policy.
Instructions to the designers: The general guideline drawn from these results is that, in
order to encourage data provisioning, the Pulso system must have a privacy policy document
which can be easily found by the user. To support users in the decision about the provision
of data, the document must explain how the privacy issues are addressed. Also, because the
respondents believe that privacy is a right guaranteed by law, legal issues must also be stated
in the privacy policy document.
Data collection
Summary of the results: Most people (37, 63.8%) understand that when using the Pulso
system, it will collect data about the locations where their mobiles were throughout the day.
In addition, most people (46, 79.3%) feel from no concern to moderate concern about the
collection of such data. Most people (43, 74.1%) would not know what to do to stop the
Pulso system from collecting their personal data.
Instructions to the designers: Despite the understanding of which data is collected and
the few concerns about such collection, people do not know how to control/interrupt the
collection in case they want to do so. System designers must pay attention to the fact that,
while using the system and perceiving privacy concerns, it is essential that users have clear
ways to stop the collection and use of their personal data. According to the respondents, it
was not clear how to do so.
5.3 Utilities and Risk Assessment 74
Information inference
Summary of the results: Only a fraction of 39.7% (23) of people believe that, by col-
lecting data on time and location where users’ smart phone have been over a day, the Pulso
system is able to find out which users were together in the same place. However, this in-
ference is possible and it is the main assumption behind the feature about “familiar faces”
provided by the Pulso system.
Instructions to the designers: People do not fully understand the additional information
that can be inferred by the system from the collected data. Designers must consider that if
users are not able to understand the information that can be inferred from the data collected
by the system, then they do not know the real risks of providing data to the system. Thus,
any information inference decision based on a risk-benefit analysis may be biased. How and
why users data are processed and used should be clearly defined in the system privacy policy.
Information use trade-offs
Summary of the results: Two designing alternatives of the Pulso system were analyzed:
1) informing how many people are “familiar faces”, and 2) informing also the names and
photos of those people who are familiar faces.
• 60.3% (35) of people think that the feature that informs users how many people are
familiar faces is very useful or extremely useful. In order to make this feature possible,
about 94.8% (55) of people are willing to allow the system to count how many people
have been in the same places that they have been. This information that they are willing
to allow the system to collect, causes from moderate concern to extreme concern in
about 34.6% (20) of people.
• 50% (29) of people think that the feature that informs the photos and names of people
who are familiar faces is very useful or extremely useful. In order to make this feature
possible, about 75.9% (44) of people would be willing to provide such data. This
information that they are willing to provide causes from moderate concern to extreme
concern in about 58.6% (34) of people.
Instructions to the designers: In choosing the feature that will be implemented, the de-
signers must consider the fact that the feature related to the name and photos of people may
compromise the adoption and use of the system. Users tend to perceive less utility, have
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more concern and be less inclined to provide data related to such feature. One alternative is
to allow users to configure the features that they want to enable.
Information exchange
Summary of the results: About the Pulso system providing users’ data to third parties,
there is no general consensus that can be presented. It seems that the aspect that causes more
concern to users is their personal data being provided to government agencies. This causes
concern above the moderate level in about 55.2% (32) of people. On the other hand, the
aspect that causes less concern to users is their personal data being provided to members of
their families. It causes concern below the moderate level in 53.4% (31) of people.
Instructions to the designers: Because people’s perception about who can access their
data is very diverse, it could be good if the system designers implement an interface that
allows each user to inform explicitly who can access his/her data.
5.3.2 Adversary Model
The possible participants in the information flow of the Pulso application are:
• Users: Disclose their information and may see the information regarding other users;
• Service: Collect the user’s information and may disclose to other users or third parties;
• Third parties: May obtain user’s information through the service.
The stakeholders of the project decided that only other users should be considered adver-
saries. They assume that the service is not an adversary and the privacy techniques may be
applied into the service. This model is similar to the ones used by popular social networks,
such as Facebook. Also, they assume that the service will not exchange the user’s data with
third parties (they do not intend to do that in the near future). Therefore, dealing with such
privacy cases is out of the scope of the project.
5.4 Privacy Techniques
Given the instructions generated from the privacy perception study, we mapped them into
privacy techniques, as presented in Figure 5.2. Next, we detail each of these techniques.
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Figure 5.2: Mapping of the instructions generated from the privacy perception study for the
Pulso application into the privacy techniques.
5.4.1 Privacy Policies and Recommendations
A privacy policy is a statement that discloses the ways a party collects, uses, discloses,
and manages a user’s data. It fulfills a legal requirement to protect a user’s privacy. It
informs the user what specific information is collected, and whether it is kept confidential or
shared. The exact contents of a privacy policy will depend upon the applicable law and may
need to address requirements across geographical boundaries and legal jurisdictions. Most
countries have their own legislation and guidelines of who is covered, what information can
be collected, and what it can be used for.
For the Pulso application, the designers must create a document, that explains how the
privacy concerns are being addressed and that there are no rules or legislation to be applied
for the users in the specific region (Brazil). Privacy recommendations may also be spread
over different views of the application, such as in famous applications, like Facebook. The
providing of privacy policies and recommendations for the users consist in an evidence of
privacy, as presented in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Sheet for the evidence E3. Privacy policies and recommendations for the Pulso
application.
E3 Privacy policies and recommendations
Status:
Done
Review Date:
November 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: For the Pulso application, the designers must create a document, that explains how
the privacy concerns are being addressed and that are no rules or legislation to be applied for the
users in the specific region (Brazil). Privacy recommendations may also be spread over different
views of the application.
References: Section 5.4.1, [80].
5.4.2 MAC Randomization
Even the users who do not use the Pulso application, have WiFi probe requests collected,
disclosed to the remote server, and accounted in the people count information. This may
imply privacy risks and with the worst magnitude: users not aware of their information
being collected and stored. When this is the case, users can still have privacy without the
need to turn off their WiFi, by enabling the MAC address randomization which is a feature
in many modern smartphones [106]. With new random MAC addresses periodically being
generated by the user devices, it should no longer be possible to track them. This possibility
also consists in an evidence of privacy, as presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Sheet for the evidence E4. MAC Randomization.
E4
Users can activate MAC randomization and
be unidentifiable
Status:
Done
Review Date:
November 2016
Weight:
3
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: Users can have privacy without the need to turn off their WiFi, by enabling the
option of MAC address randomization. With new random MAC addresses periodically being
generated by the user devices, it should no longer be possible to track them.
References: Section 5.4.2.
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5.4.3 Privacy Switch
Considering other users as possible adversaries, it may be the case that users have their
privacy violated when the application discloses their presence/absence to others. For this
reason, a privacy switch was implemented. This switch has three possible states: public
(everybody can see the user presence/absence status), private (only declared friends can see
the user status) and invisible (nobody can see the user status). To have a balance in the
privacy-utility trade-off, only users with the switch in the public position are allowed to see
public people. Users with the switch in the private or invisible position can only see their
friends that are not invisible. The implementation of a privacy switch which gives control to
the users is in accordance with the privacy definition mentioned by Stallings et al. [92] and
consists in another evidence of privacy, as presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Sheet for the evidence E5. Privacy switch.
E5
A privacy switch, with options of public,
private and invisible was implemented
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G5; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: Considering that other users may be adversaries, we implemented a privacy switch.
This switch has three possible states: public (everybody can see the user presence/absence sta-
tus), private (only declared friends can see the user status) and invisible (nobody can see the user
status).
References: Section 5.4.3.
5.4.4 Privacy Preserving on Data Publishing
The results of the perception study show that people’s perception about information exchange
is very diverse, and a good scenario is that the system designers implement an interface that
allows each user to inform explicitly which third parties can access his/her data. However,
trustiness on the service is an assumption in this application, thus, dealing with data disclo-
sure is out of scope. If this becomes a requirement in the future, concepts and techniques of
Privacy Preserving on Data Publishing, such as those presented by Fung et al. [42] and by
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Emam [40] may be applied.
5.5 Potential Attacks
We also implemented a connection timeout mechanism. The system computes the gap be-
tween the last day someone used the application, and the current date. If this gap reaches
an established threshold, the system stops associating that person’s MAC address with its
personal data (e.g. name and picture), which is equivalent to set the user as “Invisible” in
the privacy switch mechanism. The need for this mechanism was detected during the attack-
/testing activity.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we validated the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) methodology through the case
study of the Pulso application. Table 5.6 shows the checklist with the collected artifacts in
this case study.
Figure 5.3 presents the GSN for the privacy case of the Pulso application considering
the mentioned adversary model. This representation may grow, according to the normal
software evolution and our proposed methodology. In this application context, assuming
that security assurances have been taken, the service and the sensors are not adversaries,
and the data will not be disclosed to third parties, there is an argument that the privacy is
being preserved according to the provided evidences. Every evidence has an identification
to enable the traceability into the corresponding artifacts.
Even when invisible, a user still appears in the people counting of the monitored place.
This may lead to some privacy breaches and it is possible that, in some cases, the user can
still be identifiable [95]. However, the stakeholders of the project decided to do not consider
this possibility as a privacy risk. If it starts to be a privacy risk in the future, it is possible
to implement a privacy technique which adds some noise to the people counting value. This
creates uncertainty regarding presence/absence of users and enables a high privacy level
according to the differential privacy model [37], making users indistinguishable in the people
counting value.
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Table 5.6: Checklist of the artifacts produced in the Pulso case study.
Activity Artifact Supplied?
Identify the Application Context and Data Formats
Engagement Report 3
Datasets 3
Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Summary of Norms 3
Implementation of Norms 3
Compliance Proofs 3
Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Utilities List
Perception Questionnaires 3
Perception Report 3
Privacy Concerns 3
Adversary Model 3
Privacy Policy 3
Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Summary of Techniques 3
Techniques Report 3
Implementation of Techniques 3
New Utilities List
Evaluate Potential Attacks
Summary of Attacks 3
Attack Scripts
Attacks Report
When considering that the service is not an adversary, we considered the sensors that
collect data as part of the service and therefore, trusted too. This is the case for the cur-
rent purposes of deployment of the Pulso system. However, if in the future the sensors start
to be managed by other parts, such as regulatory agencies, it is possible to implement pri-
vacy techniques into the sensors (i.e., before disclosing to remote servers), and therefore,
the assumption that “the service is not an adversary” may be changed to an assumption that
“the sensor is not an adversary”. A possible privacy technique to be implemented into the
sensor may be to, instead of disclosing real MAC addresses, disclose salted hashes or en-
crypted blocks (symmetric or asymetric). This privacy technique may still provide some
utility for the application, such as the people counting in a public place. However, due to
the anonymization, for the users who wish to be identified, a comunication mechanism be-
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Figure 5.3: The GSN representation for the privacy case of the Pulso application.
tween the Pulso mobile application and the sensors would be necessary (i.e. to deactivate the
anonymization).
After validating the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) through the case study of the Pulso ap-
plication, we reinforce the conclusion that this methodology can be regarded as an effective
way to implement privacy protections. Five privacy evidences were provided and the sum
of their weights results in 19. Therefore, we positively support the research question RQ2.
Once again, it is important to note that such mitigations must be an iterative work, and thus
the stages in the methodology must happen in a constant cycle, since new risks can always
be detected.
Chapter 6
Case Study III: Lumen Application
In this chapter, we present the third case study, the Lumen1 application. This application
uses information regarding energy consumption and people counting, therefore, may bring
many privacy concerns, as already presented before. The Lumen application is a project
developed by the Federal University of Campina Grande (UFCG) in partnership with the
Hewlett Packard2 (HP) company.
6.1 Context and Data Formats
The Lumen application uses energy consumption and people counting data for energy effi-
ciency purposes. Therefore, it uses two sensor types: people counters (such as the ones of
the Pulso application) and smart meters (such as the ones of the LiteMe application).
We analysed many samples of the collected data by the Lumen application. When de-
ployed in an environment (e.g., residential or an organizational building), the Lumen appli-
cation is able to identify when there is an efficient or inefficient energy consumption. This
is based on the correlation between people counting and energy consumption: when there is
a high energy consumption and a few people in the environment, there is an inefficient con-
sumption. On the other hand, when there is a low energy consumption and enough people in
the environment, there is an efficient consumption. The formalization is presented below:
1http://web.cloud.lsd.ufcg.edu.br:45194/eff_app
2http://www.hp.com
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Ineff =
Wt −We
people+ 1
, (6.1)
where Ineff is the metric for inefficiency, Wt is the current total power usage, We is the
total power usage when the building is empty and people is the current people counting.
The subtraction of We is to obtain the power consumption only resulted by the presence of
people, i.e., excluding the devices which are powered on most of the time.
Figure 6.1: A screen of the Lumen application.
When the Ineff metric reaches a threshold, an alarm is triggered in the application
and the collaborators are notified. Since the application collects the MAC addresses of the
users, the notification is able to blame the responsible(s) for the inefficient consumption.
For example, if an employee goes home and forgets to turn off the air conditioner of his
workstation, the boss may receive a notification that such employee is being responsible for
an inefficient consumption. The application also allows the employee to add a comment in
the generated notification, for example, to apologize for his lapse.
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Figure 6.1 presents a screen of the Lumen application. In the top of the screen is a chart
with the current inefficiency profile versus the average inefficiency in previous days. The
bottom-left panel presents the comments of the users regarding the generated notifications
and the bottom-right chart presents detailed energy consumption and people counting pro-
files.
6.2 Norms and Legislation
Just like it was with Pulso and LiteMe applications, in Brazil, we did not find any law deal-
ing with the collection, storage and processing of people tracking and energy consumption
data for the Lumen application. The energy meter used by the Lumen application is just
an additional device that does not have the goal to replace existing traditional meters, and
therefore, the stipulated norms by the ANEEL are not applied. Also, Lumen collects data
from a specific monitored place in an local manner, not from the internet, and therefore, the
Marco Civil da Internet law is not applied too.
The HP company defines its own norms, according to their experience in the market
and their ethical principles, when manipulating Personally Identifiable Information - PII.
However, the stakeholders of the project defined the Lumen application as a product of the
UFCG, and therefore, does not need to follow the norms established by the HP.
Despite the lack of norms and legislation to be applied in this application, the study and
the summary of possibilities suggest a concern for privacy in this project, consisting in an
evidence of privacy. Table 6.1 describes a sheet for this evidence E1.
6.3 Utilities and Risk Assessment
Our methodology suggests the conduction of a privacy perception study for better under-
standing the risks and to build an application in accordance with the users perception of
privacy. Therefore, for the case study of the Lumen application, we conducted such this
study. The following subsection were from an analysis carried out by Lesandro Ponciano, a
human computation researcher, about the perception study.
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Table 6.1: Sheet for the evidence E1. Norms and legislations for Lumen application.
E1 Norms and legislations have been studied
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
1
PbE Activity: Check Compliance with Norms and Legislation
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: We studied and summarized possible norms and legislations that could be applied
for the Lumen application. In Brazil, we did not find any norm or law dealing with the collec-
tion, storage and processing of people tracking and energy consumption data that could affect
the design of the application. There are norms regarding data collection through the usage of
internet applications, but it is not the case of Lumen. There are also norms proposed by the
ANEEL, but only applied to official and regulated energy meters.
References: Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Privacy Perception Study
In order to assess people’s privacy perceptions and concerns towards the Lumen system, we
built a survey with a set of questions derived from five dimensions: 1) people’s general per-
ceptions, concerns, and beliefs; 2) data collection; 3) information inference; 4) information
use trade-offs; and 5) information exchange [80]. To consider the users perception in the
design of the system consists in an evidence of privacy, as presented in Table 6.2.
Two alternative features of the system were evaluated. In the first feature, the notifications
of inefficient energy consumption informs to users the room in the organization that is related
to a disproportionate consumption. In the second feature, in turn, the system informs to users
the name of the user(s) who is(are) related to an inefficient energy consumption. Figure 6.2
presents these two situations. One of the key points investigated in these features was how
the users perceive the possibility of their rooms or their names being publicly associated to
the cause of an inefficient consumption in the organization.
The context of the system is explained to the respondent by presenting screens of the
application and a video prototype that explain how the whole system works – the video
prototype is available at https://youtu.be/XyB6MmHmNYA. The survey was de-
signed by using Google Forms tools; it is now retired and permanently available at https:
//goo.gl/forms/y9W1TVrxQ81mPI483. A pilot survey was conducted with 8 re-
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Table 6.2: Sheet for the evidence E2. A privacy perception study of the Lumen application.
E2 A privacy perception study has been conducted
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: For the Lumen application, we conducted a privacy perception study with a sur-
vey considering five dimensions that represent perspectives in which it is possible to approach
users privacy, which are: 1) people’s general perceptions, concerns, and beliefs; 2) data collec-
tion; 3) information inference; 4) information use trade-offs; and 5) information exchange. 55
people answered the survey and the results have been considered into the design of the Lumen
application.
References: Section 6.3.1, [80].
spondents in order to identify and to fix problems in the survey.
After validating the survey, answers from participants were collected in three organiza-
tions from Campina Grande, Brazil. The organizations include computer science research
laboratories and a software development company. Each respondent had access to the link
of the survey. They answered individually, without any external interference. In all, 55 peo-
ple answered the survey, being 50 (90.9%) male and 5 (9.1%) female respondents, aging
mostly between 25 and 34 years old (36, 65.5%). Most of them completed undergraduate
(45, 81.8%) or master degree (6, 10.9%). This population of respondents is clearly skewed.
However, it is representative of the target audience of the Lumen system. Next, we turn to
detail the results obtained from the survey according to the defined five dimensions.
General perception, beliefs and attitudes
Summary of the results: Most people (34, 61.8%) believe that privacy is a right guar-
anteed by law. The main criteria considered by most people (32, 58.2%) to decide about
providing information requested by the system is if it explains its privacy policy. Only few
people (7, 12.7%) base their data provision decision on the fact of the system offers to them
something in exchange to their private data.
Instructions to the designers: For such users’ profile, the following guidelines should be
considered by the designers: 1) to convince the user to provide data, the system should rely
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(a) Informing the room in the organization that
is related to a disproportionate consumption.
(b) Informing the name of the user who is related
to a disproportionate consumption.
Figure 6.2: Two possibilities of notifications generated by the Lumen application.
more on providing to them data control guarantees than on proposing to them a bargain in
which it offers something in exchange for the data; 2) the system should provide a privacy
policy document about data collection and control that can be easily found by the users; 3)
relevant aspects foreseen in the legislation must be stated in the privacy policy document.
Data collection
Summary of the results: Users are able to understand which kind of data is collected
by the system: most people (46, 83.6%) correctly identify that the system collects data on
the locations and times that their cell phones were in the organization, and only 1.8% (1)
of users incorrectly identify the system is able to collect data about their health conditions.
However, many users (26, 47.3%) do not understand how they would stop the collection of
their personal data if they want to do so. In general, the information collected by the system
does not cause great privacy concern to users; for example: few users (7, 12.7%) express
concern above the moderate level in the collection of times that they came and left work,
few users (8, 14.5%) express concern above the moderate level on the collection of which
other mobiles were close to their mobiles; and also few users (4, 7.3%) express concern
above the moderate level on the collection of data about electrical devices that they use the
organization. The minority who feels concern about such collections should have ways in
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the system to control the collection of their data or have privacy guarantees that make them
feel less concerned.
Instructions to the designers: Two guidelines for system design can be drawn from these
results: 1) the system should make it clearer to users how they can stop the collection of
their personal data or make it clearer if the collection is done in a way that guarantees their
privacy; 2) Control over the collection should be available to each kind of data collected by
the system.
Information inference
Summary of the results: In general, users are able to understand which kind of informa-
tion is inferred by the system: for example, 85.5% (47) of people correctly identify that the
system is able to infer the places where users were in the organization throughout the day,
and 83.5% (46) of people correctly identify that the system is able to infer which users were
together in the same place in the organization. The information inferred by the system does
not cause great concern to users; information about places in the organization where users
have been over a day (4 users or 7.2% of users express concern above the moderate level);
information about people with whom users have been in the organization (5 users or 9.1%
of users express concern above the moderate level); and information about electrical devices
that users use in the organization (2 users or 3.6% of users express concern above the mod-
erate level). Thus, in general, the current picture of data inference by the system does not
cause privacy concern in the majority of the users.
Instructions to the designers: Three guidelines for system design can be drawn from
these results: 1) The system should provide ways that the minority of users who feel con-
cerned about information inference can exert control over it; 2) Because the users’ level of
concerns vary with the type of inferred information, the system may allow users to control
the inference of each information differently; 3) the privacy policy document should provide
details about which kind of information is inferred by the system and whether the system do
the inference in a way to provide privacy for the users.
Information use trade-offs
Summary of the results: Two alternative features were evaluated in the survey. In the
first feature, the system informs to users the room in the organization that is related to a
disproportionate energy consumption. Most users perceive high utility in this feature (34
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people or 61% of people perceive the feature as very useful or extremely useful), and they
consider that this feature is low or moderate harmful in terms of privacy (52 people or 95% of
people feel moderated concerned or lower in terms of privacy). In the second feature, in turn,
the system informs to users the name of the user who is related to a disproportionate energy
consumption in the organization. Few users perceive high utility in this feature (21 people or
38.1% of people perceive the feature as very useful or extremely useful) and many of them
consider this feature low or moderate harmful in terms of privacy (39 people or 70.9% of
people feel moderated concerned or lower in terms of privacy).
Instructions to the designers: From these results, the following advice can be draw: 1)
providing notifications that inform the room related to a disproportionate energy consump-
tion in the organization would be well perceived (in terms of utility and privacy) by the users,
so it can be used in the system; 2) providing notifications of a disproportionate energy con-
sumption that associate the problem with a name of a user is something perceived as less
useful and more worrying in terms of privacy.
Information exchange
Summary of the results: In general, users are concerned about their data being leaked
or made available to third parties. Many of them feel very or extremely concerned of their
data being provided to their colleagues (26, 47.3%) or being provided to their superiors
(24, 43.6%). Also, the majority of them feel very or extremely concerned of their data
being provided to other systems (34, 61.81%) or being provided to government agencies
(32, 58.18%). Thus, users care about which third parties can have access to the data that the
system collects about them.
Instructions to the designers: 1) The system should made explicit to which third parties
user’s data is provided and which kind of data is provided; 2) Users disagree among them in
terms of whether their data may be accessible or not to their colleagues and superiors; thus,
concerns in this regard must be addressable to each individual user; 3) User’s data cannot
be provided to government agencies or to other systems; procedures that are different from
this must be stated to the users. 4) The system must protect user’s data against unauthorized
access from third parties.
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6.3.2 Adversary Model
We considered the possible participants in the information flow of the Lumen application:
• Users: Disclose their information and may see the information regarding other users;
• Service: Collect the user’s information and may disclose to other users or third parties;
• Third parties: May obtain user’s information through the service.
The stakeholders of the project decided that only other users should be considered adver-
saries. They assume that the service is not an adversary and the privacy techniques may be
applied into the service. Also, they assume that the service will not exchange the user’s data
with third parties (they do not intend to do that in the near future). Therefore, dealing with
such privacy cases is out of the scope of the project.
6.4 Privacy Techniques
Given the instructions generated from the privacy perception study, we mapped them into
privacy techniques, as presented in Figure 6.3. Next, we detail each of these techniques.
Figure 6.3: Mapping of the instructions generated from the privacy perception study for the
Lumen application into the privacy techniques.
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6.4.1 Privacy Policies and Recommendations
For the Lumen application, the designers must create a document, that explains how the
privacy concerns are being addressed and that there are no rules or legislation to be applied
for the users in the specific region (Brazil). Privacy recommendations may also be spread
over different views of the application, such as occur in famous applications, like Facebook’s.
The providing of privacy policies and recommendations for the users consist in an evidence
of privacy, as presented in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Sheet for the evidence E3. Privacy policies and recommendations for the Lumen
application.
E3 Privacy policies and recommendations
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: For the Lumen application, the designers must create a document, that explains
how the privacy concerns are being addressed and that are no rules or legislation to be applied
for the users in the specific region (Brazil). Privacy recommendations may also be spread over
different views of the application.
References: Section 6.4.1, [80].
6.4.2 MAC Randomization
Even the users who do not use the Lumen application, have WiFi probe requests collected,
disclosed to the remote server, and accounted in the people count and energy efficiency
information. When this is the case, users can still have privacy without the need to turn off
their WiFi, by enabling the option of MAC address randomization [106]. With new random
MAC addresses periodically being generated by the user devices, it should no longer be
possible to track them. This possibility also consists in an evidence of privacy, as presented
in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4: Sheet for the evidence E4. MAC Randomization.
E4
Users can activate MAC randomization and
be unidentifiable
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
3
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: Users can have privacy without the need to turn off their WiFi, by enabling the
option of MAC address randomization. With new random MAC addresses periodically being
generated by the user devices, it should no longer be possible to track them.
References: Section 6.4.2.
6.4.3 Privacy Switch
Although the privacy perception study points that providing notifications of a disproportion-
ate energy consumption that associate the problem with a name of a user (such as presented
in Figure 6.2b) is something perceived as less useful and more worrying in terms of privacy,
the stakeholders of the project believe that users will be more conscious in saving energy if
this feature is available. Therefore, it became a requirement of the system to associate the
problem with the name of the user (blaming).
For the users who want privacy and do not want to be associated, we implemented a
privacy switch. This switch has two possible states: visible (in a notification, the name of
the user will be associated to the disproportionate energy consumption) and invisible (the
name of the user will not be associated in the notification). To find a balance in the privacy
and utility tradeoff, users are encouraged to keep their privacy switch in the visible position.
There is a gamification scheme, where visible users gain points in a ranking. In the end,
users with more points (i.e., who more save energy) earn some awards.
The implementation of a privacy switch which gives control to the users is in accordance
with the privacy definition mentioned by Stallings et al. [92]. With this privacy technique,
we have another evidence of privacy, as presented in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5: Sheet for the evidence E5. Privacy switch.
E5
A privacy switch, with options of public
and invisible was implemented
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2016
Weight:
5
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ S1→ G5; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2, As3
Description: Considering that other users may be adversaries, we implemented a privacy switch.
This switch has two possible states: visible (in a notification, the name of the user will be
associated to the disproportionate energy consumption) and invisible (the name of the user will
not be associated in the notification).
References: Section 6.4.3.
6.4.4 Privacy Preserving on Data Publishing
The results of the perception study show that users disagree among them in terms of whether
their data may be accessible or not to third parties or to their colleagues and superiors. Trusti-
ness on the service is an assumption in this application, thus, dealing with data disclosure
to third parties is out of scope. If this becomes a requirement in the future, concepts and
techniques such as those presented by Fung et al. [42] and by Emam [40] may be applied.
For the colleagues and superiors, the privacy switch technique, presented in Section 6.4.3,
should mitigate the problem.
6.5 Potential Attacks
We also implemented a connection timeout mechanism. The system computes the gap be-
tween the last day someone used the application, and the current date. If this gap reaches an
established threshold, the system stops associating that person’s MAC address with a noti-
fication of inefficient consumption, which is equivalent to set the user as “Invisible” in the
privacy switch mechanism. The need for this mechanism was detected during the attack/test-
ing activity.
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6.6 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we validated the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) methodology through the case
study of the Lumen application. Table 6.6 shows the checklist with the collected artifacts in
this case study.
Table 6.6: Checklist of the artifacts produced in the Lumen case study.
Activity Artifact Supplied?
Identify the Application Context and Data Formats
Engagement Report 3
Datasets 3
Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Summary of Norms 3
Implementation of Norms 3
Compliance Proofs 3
Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Utilities List
Perception Questionnaires 3
Perception Report 3
Privacy Concerns 3
Adversary Model 3
Privacy Policy 3
Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Summary of Techniques 3
Techniques Report 3
Implementation of Techniques 3
New Utilities List
Evaluate Potential Attacks
Summary of Attacks 3
Attack Scripts
Attacks Report
Figure 6.4 presents the GSN for the privacy case of the Lumen application considering
the mentioned adversary model. This representation may grow, according to the normal
software evolution and our proposed methodology. In this application context, assuming
that security assurances have been taken, the service and the sensors are not adversaries,
and the data will not be disclosed to third parties, there is an argument that the privacy is
being preserved according to the provided evidences. Every evidence has an identification
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to enable the traceability into the corresponding artifacts.
Figure 6.4: The GSN representation for the privacy case of the Lumen application.
Even when invisible, a user still appears in the people counting from the monitored place.
This may lead to some privacy breaches and it is possible that, in some cases, the user
can still be identifiable [95]. However, the stakeholders of the project decided to do not
consider this possibility as a privacy risk. If it starts to be in the future, it is possible to
implement a privacy technique which adds some noise to the people counting value. This
creates uncertainty regarding presence/absence of users and enables a high privacy level
according to the differential privacy model [37], making users indistinguishable in the people
counting value.
Another possible privacy risk is that even when invisible, the consumption habits of a user
still appears in the consumption profile and from this, it is possible to infer much information,
as presented in Chapter 4. However, the stakeholders of the project decided to do not consider
this possibility as a privacy risk. If it starts to be in the future, it is possible to implement a
privacy technique which adds some noise to the energy consumption value, as presented in
Section 4.4.1.
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When considering that the service is not an adversary, we considered the sensors that
collect data as part of the service and therefore, trusted too. If in the future the sensors
start to be managed by other parts, such as regulatory agencies, it is possible to implement
privacy techniques into the sensors (i.e., before disclosing to remote servers), and therefore,
the assumption that “the service is not an adversary” may be changed to an assumption that
“the sensor is not an adversary”.
After validating the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) through the case study of the Lumen
application, we reinforce the conclusion that this methodology can be regarded as an effective
way to implement privacy protections. Five privacy evidences were provided and the sum
of their weights results in 19. Therefore, we positively support the research question RQ3.
Once again, it is important to note that such mitigations must be an iterative work.
Chapter 7
Case Study IV: Two Factor
Authentication System
In this chapter, we present the fourth case study, a two factor authentication system. This
application uses information regarding people presence, therefore, may bring many privacy
concerns, as already presented before.
The development team consisted in a manager and a developer. To avoid biasing, differ-
ent than the previous case studies, this application was developed without the participation of
the author. For this, the Think Aloud method [27; 91] was used to gather information regard-
ing the usage of PbE by the development team without influencing what participants say and
do, and hence, use such useful information as feedback in order to improve the methodology.
In usability testing [78], the Think Aloud method is a protocol to help the observer un-
derstand the emotional and practical user experience of a product or prototype. It requires
the user to not only say his or her thoughts out loud, but also to explain and justify them. For
example, an observer in a think aloud usability test for a website may expect a user clicking
on a link and justifying this action by explaining his/her interest on it. This may produce
valuable data on how to improve the user interface. The observer may be very surprised
when a user does not click on a button that has been optimized and positioned in a prominent
spot of the page layout. This could be due to the color of the button or the text on the button
label. The product or prototype is then modified based on this feedback.
There are other proposed protocols too, but Think Aloud may be the single most valuable
usability engineering method [71]. We instantiated this protocol to our work (i.e., instead
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of observing users testing an interface design, we observe a development team using our
proposed methodology, PbE). The author found this instantiation reasonable, since it does
not lose the essence of the Think Aloud protocol. During this experiment, the following
activities were conducted:
• The development team develops the application using PbE. During the development,
they write their thoughts and information regarding their produced artifacts in a elec-
tronic document (Google docs);
• The observer monitors the development in person and takes notes regarding the deci-
sions taken by the development team;
• The observer also monitors the electronic document and verifies if the content is in
accordance with his notes. In case of divergence, the observer asks questions to the
development team, without biasing the team, however. All the artifacts, including the
provided evidences of privacy and code repositories are monitored too;
• Confusions and misunderstandings made by the development team are used to review
and improve the methodology. However, to avoid biasing, such occurrences are not
revealed to the team and are considered only after the experiment;
• Developers may also implicitly suggest improvements on the methodology. The sug-
gestions are considered only after the end of the experiment;
7.1 Methodology
First, the developer was asked to read about the PbE methodology and write a summary. In
his own words, PbE is composed by:
• Privacy team acting together with development team
• Steps:
a) Identify application context and data format
b) Check compliance with norms and legislation
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– Evidence: norms and legislation compliance
c) Identify utilities and risk assessment
– Evidence: users perception
d) Evaluate and apply privacy techniques
– Evidences: privacy metrics and techniques
e) Evaluate potential attacks
– Evidences: resilience to attacks
After making sure that the developer read about PbE, we started the experiment. The
hypothesis considered in this experiment was based on RQ4. Recall that:
• RQ4: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly two factor authentication applica-
tion?
The considered metric is the number of provided evidences and their sum of weights. If
the development of the two factor authentication application is being able to produce evi-
dences of privacy protection, then this indicates that PbE is being helpful. Therefore, the
considered hypothesis is:
• H0: If the team uses PbE, it will provide evidences of privacy.
7.1.1 Threats to Validity
The hypothesis H0 may be considered a good hypothesis and, at first glance, appears easily
testable. The problem is that, in a solid experimental design, the opposite (contrapositive)
should also be true. The design of experiment dictates that, if a certain event does not occur,
the tested outcome will not happen, a subtle but crucial factor [101]. The reason for this
is that it ensures that there is a genuine causal relationship between the independent and
dependent variables. Therefore, the following statement should also be true.
• H1: If the team does not use PbE, it will not provide evidences of privacy.
The problem is, in this experiment, for avoid biasing, it would be necessary to have
another development team developing the same two factor authentication application, but
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without using PbE. Actually, even that would not be sufficient. It would be more interesting
to have a set of development teams (subjects) for H1 and another set for H0. That experi-
ment would provide results with statistical confidence, but would require a lot of human and
financial resources.
Because of this, the examining committee of this dissertation defense suggested the ex-
periment with the usage of the Think Aloud protocol to observe one development team and
to gather useful information as feedback, in order to improve the proposed methodology.
We recognize this as a good plan, and went in this direction. However, we could not avoid
recognizing the threats to the validity, and therefore, leaving the experiment of evaluating a
set of development team using PbE and another set not using it as a possible future work.
Once the author was not part of the development, it is important to note that the informa-
tion contained in the next sections may not be in accordance with his opinion and beliefs. In
Section 7.7 is presented a critical point of view and the lessons learned from the feedback of
this experiment.
7.2 Context and Data Formats
The application aims to authenticate users by using two factors (password and presence of
the MAC address of the mobile phone). To make this possible, it should provide operations
like registration, removal, and authentication of users. A user is registered with name, easy
and hard passwords, and MAC address. For removal operation, just the username is needed.
To authenticate, a user must specify the name, type the easy password and the system must
detect the presence of his/her MAC address. If the easy password and MAC address are
correct, the user is authenticated; if the MAC address is not validated/sensed, the user still
can be authenticated, but using the hard password.
The information of authenticated users could be used for many purposes and by different
external applications, such as email systems, code repositories, social networks, access to
physical buildings, computer logins, and many others, similar to OAuth services [29]. In this
case study, it was considered just an application of access control to a physical building (the
Distributed Systems Laboratory at Federal University of Campina Grande).
The data regarding user registration is exchanged in JSON format, like the example be-
7.3 Norms and Legislation 101
low:
1 {
2 "username": "Dalton",
3 "easy": "1234",
4 "hard": "F!t0miRlr3t:Dj",
5 "MAC": "00:28:f8:4f:38:13"
6 }
The easy password has 4-digit format and the hard password has between 8 and 15 char-
acters.
7.3 Norms and Legislation
Just like it was with the LiteMe, Pulso, and Lumen applications, in Brazil, the development
team did not find any laws dealing with the collection, storage and processing of people
presence for the two factor authentication system. This reinforces our argument that in Brazil
there is a lack of laws concerning protection of personal data.
Different than the previous case studies, the development team did not consider the effort
of searching for appropiate laws and norms as an evidence of privacy, although the applica-
tion can still be considered as in accordance with the set of Brazilian privacy laws (because
none is applied).
7.4 Utilities and Risk Assessment
For the risk assessment, the team first identified what is possible to do with the collected
MAC addresses and timestamps. Some utilities that use such data were listed in Table 7.1.
From this list, using a risk binary scale, “Investigate people’s behaviour at the laboratory”
and “Identify presence of people in the laboratory” were considered as privacy threats that
needed to be solved.
The team did not carry out the perception study, so it was not possible to generate a
perception report including threats and privacy recommendations. However, the developer,
based on his experience, listed the following privacy concerns:
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Table 7.1: List of data utilities for the two factor authentication system.
Feature / Benefit
Privacy
Risk?
2 factor authentication system to allow/deny access to the laboratory No
Identify the users/members of the laboratory No
Investigate people’s behaviour (time of entrance/exit, people counting, etc.) Yes
Identify presence of people in the laboratory Yes
• The easy password must not be discovered by an adversary;
• The hard password must not be discovered by an adversary;
• The MAC address must not be discovered by an adversary.
From the privacy concerns, we could observe that the team is concerned not only with
the MAC addresses, but also with the attributes of easy and hard password. Based on this,
the team created a privacy policy: Our privacy policy guarantees that no one can see the
data stored by the system. This includes all the passwords (easy and hard) and the MAC
addresses. Only the usernames can be visualized by the administrators.
7.4.1 Adversary Model
An adversary considered by the team was someone with the ability of accessing and sniff-
ing the Intranet and getting the communication messages between sensors, server and clients
(man-in-the-middle). Another considered adversary is an evil admin, a malicious administra-
tor of the system with the ability of, for example, dumping the database containing the MAC
addresses and passwords. With such information, both adversaries could be authenticated in
place of a victim, or even observe the behaviour of people in the laboratory.
Similar to the previous case studies, the sensors were not considered as adversaries.
Therefore, it could, for example, be regulated by a regulatory agency, and have implementa-
tion of privacy techniques.
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7.5 Privacy Techniques
To achieve the requirements of the privacy policy, some techniques can be applied. The first
considered technique was the usage of encrypted and authenticated communication between
sensors, server and clients. This was achieved through the usage of HTTPS (Hyper Text
Transfer Protocol Secure) and, therefore, the application can be regarded as resilient to the
man-in-the-middle adversary. The usage of this technique consists in an evidence of privacy,
as presented in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2: Sheet for evidence E1. HTTPS communication.
E1 Data transmissions are over HTTPS
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2017
Weight:
20
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G2; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Users can have privacy during data exchange because the sensitive data can not
be discovered during the transmission. Communications between a client application and the
server and between a sensor and the server are over HTTPS.
References: Section 7.5.
Another privacy technique was to store salted hashes of the easy and hard passwords.
Therefore, an evil admin with the ability to dump the database would not be able to extract
the original passwords. This leads us to the second evidence of privacy, E2, as presented in
Table 7.3.
Another privacy technique was to store salted hashes of the MAC addresses. Therefore,
an evil admin with the ability to dump the database would not be able to extract the original
MAC addresses. This leads us to the third evidence of privacy, E3, as presented in Table 7.4.
The thought is that, since the evil admin is not able to obtain the original MAC addresses, he
or she will not be able to track the users.
So far, with the provision of the three evidences of privacy, the developer was satisfied
with the privacy techniques and moved on to the next PbE activity (evaluate potential at-
tacks). In this stage, the developer noticed possibilities that he have not noticed before, more
specifically, possible privacy attacks. He noticed that if the evil admin tracks the process into
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Table 7.3: Sheet for evidence E2. Salted hashes of the easy and
hard passwords.
E2 Salted hashes of passwords are stored.
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2017
Weight:
13
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G3; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: The easy and hard passwords of the users are not stored in plaintext. They are
stored in the form of salted hashes. For this, the key derivation function PBKDF2 (Password-
Based Key Derivation Function 2) with SHA256 was used. The salt is the own username, which
is stored alongside the password hashes.
References: Section 7.5.
the server (e.g., using ptrace system call), or even develop his/her own malicious application,
it is possible to dump the easy and hard passwords and the MAC addresses before the hashes
computation. In other words, the attack vector was not only the database, but many other
areas into the server. To mitigate this issue, the developer decided to use features provided
by Intel SGX (Software Guard eXtensions) and generated another evidence of privacy, as
presented in Table 7.5.
Intel SGX is available on recent off-the-shelf processors based on the Skylake microar-
chitecture or newer, and already has a wide variety of research publications related to its
applicability on real world scenarios [48]. It is a hardware-based technology for ensuring
privacy of sensitive data from disclosure or modification that enables user-level applications
to allocate protected areas of memory called enclaves [64]. Such memory areas are crypto-
graphically protected even from code running with higher privilege levels. This technology
also provides means for users/applications to verify if a given application is running inside an
Intel SGX enclave, and even check if the code of the application is indeed the one expected
to be running there, a process called Remote Attestation [6].
In this case study, the server running the two factor authentication system uses an en-
clave to receive and process the passwords from the clients and the MAC addresses from
the sensors. The communications with the enclave (bindings) are protected through Remote
Attestation processes.
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Table 7.4: Sheet for evidence E3. Salted hashes of the MAC addresses.
E3 Salted hashes of MAC addresses are stored.
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2017
Weight:
13
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G4; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: The MAC addresses of the users are not stored in plaintext. They are stored in
the form of salted hashes. For this, the key derivation function PBKDF2 (Password-Based Key
Derivation Function 2) with SHA256 was used. The salt is the easy password, which is sent by
the user when requesting to log in. Since the evil admin is not able to obtain the original MAC
addresses, he or she will not be able to track the users.
References: Section 7.5.
When the enclave receives a current detected MAC address from the sensor, it stores in
a data structure for 30 minutes. When a user logs in, the client sends to the enclave the
username and the easy password. Thus, the enclave computes the hash of the easy password
(using the username as salt), and iterates through the data structure of MAC addresses and
also computing the hashes (using the easy password as salt). If a combination of username,
hash of easy password, and hash of MAC address matches with a record in the database
stored in the file system, then the user is authenticated. Figure 7.1 presents the architecture
of this implementation.
Figure 7.1: Architecture of the two factor authentication system.
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Table 7.5: Sheet for evidence E4. Usage of Intel SGX features.
E4
The server application runs in an
Intel SGX enclave.
Status:
Done
Review Date:
December 2017
Weight:
40
PbE Activity: Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Driven by: G1→ G5; In context of : C1; Assumptions: As1, As2
Description: Intel SGX is a hardware-based technology that enables user-level applications to
allocate protected areas of memory, called enclaves, for ensuring privacy of sensitive data from
disclosure or modification. Such memory areas are cryptographically protected even from code
running with higher privilege levels. The server running the two factor authentication system
uses an enclave to receive the passwords from the clients and the MAC addresses from the
sensors. The communications which the enclave (bindings) are protected through Remote At-
testation processes.
References: Section 7.5.
Table 7.6 presents the list from Table 7.1 but with an additional column (supported or
not). From the features that are not supported, “Investigate people’s behaviour (time of
entrance/exit, people counting, etc.)” and “Identify presence of people in the laboratory” can
be considered as privacy threats that were solved.
Table 7.6: List of data utilities and the impact after the usage of the privacy techniques.
Feature / Benefit
Privacy
Risk?
Support
2 factor authentication system to allow/deny access to the laboratory No 3
Identify the users/members of the laboratory No 3
Investigate people’s behaviour (time of entrance/exit, people counting, etc.) Yes
Identify presence of people in the laboratory Yes
7.6 Potential Attacks
In this stage, the developer thought and detailed the following attacks:
• Man-in-the-middle: some attacker with access to the network, sniffing it, trying to get
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sensitive data. This attack is mitigated with the encrypted and authenticated channels.
• Evil admin: a worker/collaborator with access to the server trying to steal some sen-
sitive data. Initially, the developer mitigated this possibility with the usage of salted
hashes. However, in the attack phase, he noticed other attack vectors, such as process
tracing. This motivated him to go back to the activity of implementation of privacy
techniques and to use Intel SGX.
• MAC Spoofing: the developer was always aware that an attacker (man-in-the-middle,
or evil admin) with access to the easy passwords and MAC addresses would be able
to pretend to be a valid user, matching the password together with a spoofed MAC
address.
7.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, Privacy by Evidence (PbE) methodology was validated through the case
study of a two factor authentication system. Table 7.7 shows the checklist with the collected
artifacts in this case study.
Figure 7.2 presents the GSN for the privacy case of the two factor authentication system
considering the mentioned adversary model. This representation may grow, according to
the normal software evolution and our proposed methodology. In this application context,
assuming that security assurances have been taken, and that the sensors are not adversaries,
there is an argument that the privacy is being preserved according to the provided evidences.
Every evidence has an identification to enable the traceability into the corresponding arti-
facts.
After validating the Privacy by Evidence (PbE) through the case study of the two factor
authentication system, we reinforce the conclusion that this methodology can be regarded as
an effective way to implement privacy protections. Four privacy evidences were provided
and the sum of their weights results in 86. Therefore, we positively support the research
question RQ4. Once again, it is important to note that such mitigations must be an iterative
work.
During the experiment with the think aloud protocol, the developer had a few considera-
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Table 7.7: Checklist of the artifacts produced in the two factor authentication system case
study.
Activity Artifact Supplied?
Identify the Application Context and Data Formats
Engagement Report 3
Datasets 3
Check Compliance with Norms and Legislations
Summary of Norms 3
Implementation of Norms
Compliance Proofs
Identify Utilities and Risk Assessment
Utilities List 3
Perception Questionnaires
Perception Report
Privacy Concerns 3
Adversary Model 3
Privacy Policy 3
Evaluate and Apply Privacy Techniques
Summary of Techniques 3
Techniques Report 3
Implementation of Techniques 3
New Utilities List 3
Evaluate Potential Attacks
Summary of Attacks 3
Attack Scripts
Attacks Report
tions to improve the methodology:
• Criticized the provision of evidences of privacy regarding norms/legislations when
there is no norm/legislation to be complied with.
• Initially, the “New Utilities List” artifact was provided before the “Implementation of
Techniques” but he suggested to provide after, once the utilities impact are defined just
after the implementation of the privacy techniques. We accepted the suggestion and
made the modification into the checklist.
• Initially, the “Privacy Concerns” artifact was part of the “Perception Report” artifact.
He suggested to separate them, once one can define possible privacy concerns without
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Figure 7.2: The GSN representation for the privacy case of the two factor authentication
system.
conducting a privacy perception study (e.g., based on the experience of the developer
or on a conducted analysis). We accepted the suggestion and made the modification
into the checklist.
Beyond the provision of the evidences of privacy and the confirmation of hypothesis
H0, we also noticed an important action that was triggered due the usage of PbE: during the
“Evaluate Potential Attacks” activity, the developer detected the attack of extracting sensitive
information from the memory area of the process and reexecuted the “Evaluate and Apply
Privacy Techniques” activity, aiming to mitigate the detected issue. We suspect that, without
the attacking phase, the developer would proceed without detecting the threat.
We also observed that, in some situations, the developer may have confused the concepts
of security and privacy. For example, we consider the case of the attacker extracting the easy
password and the MAC address of a user as a security issue. The attacker would have access
in place of the victim, but in the first place it is not a privacy issue. Of course that privacy
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violations may be derived from this issue, but indirectly. Thus, we believe that would be
appropriate to consider these mitigations as "security assumptions", and keep the efforts on
the privacy issues from the defined scope.
The confusion between the concepts of security and privacy suggests that, before starting
the development, it would be useful for the developers to have a small period of training
regarding security, privacy, and their differences. The duration and the content of the training
would depend on the application context and the experience of the team. Recall that some
authors divide the goals of information security as availability, integrity and confidentiality.
Also, some authors classify privacy as a sub-goal of confidentiality [92; 86]. Lauren Henry
[86] presents a discussion about the differences between information security and privacy,
showing that they have separate objectives and sometimes can even be in opposition to each
other (known as a Privacy vs. Security trade-off).
From the data manipulated by the two factor authentication system, we see examples of
privacy as discovering who was where, when, and with whom. Such information may be
extracted from the “30 minute MAC Table” stored into the process memory area. Therefore,
we consider that the development team was right in defining the usage of Intel SGX as a
privacy technique.
We do not consider the designed salted hashes scheme as secure. The evil admin is still
able to perform the following attack:
• Get the username of the victim and the salted hash of the easy password and replace
into the values of the salt and hash_easy_pwd variables from the Python script below.
Running in a machine with i7-7600U CPU of 2.80GHz and four cores, this script takes
on average 98 seconds to find the correct easy password. This time is lower if using
multiple threads.
1 from passlib.hash import pbkdf2_sha256
2
3 salt = "Dalton"
4 hash_easy_pass = "$pbkdf2-sha256$29000$RGFsdG9u$yYUBIt.MIfJOmILOy
J0OtXOp8CRbk6U7aBuubTraWAw"
5
6 for i in range(0, 9999 + 1):
7 easy_pass = "%04d" % i
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8 if pbkdf2_sha256.hash(easy_pass, salt=salt) == hash_easy_pass:
9 print("Found easy password: " + easy_pass)
10 break
• Identify the vendor of the mobile phone of the victim or guess it (e.g., Samsung, Apple
or Sony). The IEEE Standards Association defines a MAC address as six bytes, where
the first three bytes identifies the vendor1(named as OUI - Organizationally Unique
Identifier) and the last three bytes identifies the device. Knowing the OUI of the vendor
of the victim’s mobile phone, the easy password discovered in the previous step, and
the salted hash of the MAC address, replace into the values of oui, salt and hash_mac
variables from the Python script below. Running the script in a machine with i7-7600U
CPU of 2.80GHz and four cores, this script takes on average 24 hours, 17 minutes and
4 seconds, to find the correct MAC address.
1 from passlib.hash import pbkdf2_sha256
2 from threading import Thread
3 import os
4
5 oui = "\x00\x28\xf8"
6 salt = "1234"
7 hash_mac = "$pbkdf2-sha256$29000$MTIzNA$9zqSyuzuJg6p2MV/.gcKI1zNfW
joBJCqDP5o2expMu4"
8
9 def brute(begin, end):
10 for b1 in range(begin, end):
11 for b2 in range(0, 0xff + 1):
12 for b3 in range(0, 0xff + 1):
13 mac = oui + chr(b1) + chr(b2) + chr(b3)
14 if pbkdf2_sha256.hash(mac, salt=salt) == hash_mac:
15 print("Found MAC address: " + mac.encode("hex"))
16 os._exit(0)
17
18 delta = (0xff + 1)/4
19
20 Thread(target=brute, args=(0, delta)).start()
1https://macvendors.com/ presents a tool to query for MAC address vendors
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21 Thread(target=brute, args=(delta, 2*delta)).start()
22 Thread(target=brute, args=(2*delta, 3*delta)).start()
23 Thread(target=brute, args=(3*delta, 4*delta)).start()
• With the MAC address obtained in the previous step, change the MAC address of the
wireless network interface. Most of the Linux distributions provide the macchanger2
command in their repository. For example, the command below changes the current
MAC address to 00:28:f8:4f:38:13.
sudo macchanger −−mac 0 0 : 2 8 : f8 : 4 f : 3 8 : 1 3 wlan0
After following these steps, and sending the obtained easy password to the server, the
attacker obtains access to the rest of the system.
Despite using a recommended hash algorithm (PBKDF2 has additional computational
cost, aimed to make brute force attacks much slower), the search spaces of easy passwords
and MAC addresses are small. Also the usage of a fixed salt (username) is not recommended.
These facts reinforce the need of training developers in security and privacy aspects, before
starting the development.
We do not consider the presence of security vulnerabilities as an invalidation of the PbE
methodology. First, we acknowledge that there is no 100% secure system and actually this
is our main motivation for providing the mitigations just as “evidences of privacy”, not guar-
antees. Second, the unauthorized access, in principle, may not be considered as a privacy
issue, as we mentioned before. Although security issues may impact privacy, the recommen-
dation of PbE is to delegate security responsibilities to a separate team, considering them
as assumptions. However, the developer took care on protecting the table containing the
timestamps and the MAC addresses of the current people (i.e., the data that may contain the
sensitive information of who was where, when, and with whom) and because of this, we
consider that PbE was validated in achieving its goal.
2GNU MAC Changer http://www.gnu.org/software/macchanger
Chapter 8
Final Considerations
The internet is connecting more devices every day and this growth carries several benefits.
However, there are many concerns of privacy. For a company, being able to state that its
product is “privacy-friendly” is a competitive advantage. When carrying forward the concern
of privacy preserving, there are rules to follow and techniques to apply. Unfortunately, there
is a lack of methodologies to guide the development, applying in practice the rules and
privacy techniques.
Privacy by Design (PbD) consists in 7 foundational principles to be followed when devel-
oping systems that should take into account users privacy. However, these principles alone
are not enough. They are still vague and leave many open questions on how to apply them
in practice. In this work, we aimed to develop a generalizable methodology to fill this gap.
We identified the key concepts to be considered when dealing with privacy-friendly ap-
plications and described a conceptual framework, aiming to generate a manageable knowl-
edge to be used in our proposed methodology. The concepts are: participants (users, project
owner, development team, regulatory agency, privacy engineer, attacker and data recipient);
application context; data formats; data sensitivity; privacy norms and legislation; users per-
ception of privacy; privacy techniques; attacks; privacy models; data utility; and security.
We proposed the concept of Privacy by Evidence (PbE), a software development method-
ology to provide privacy assurance. PbE is in accordance with all the 7 principles defined
by PbD, and therefore, PbE may be considered as an extension of PbD. PbE consists in the
execution of five activities in parallel with the development of the application. The activi-
ties are: identify the application context and data format; check compliance with norms and
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legislation; identify utilities and risk assessment; evaluate and apply privacy techniques; and
evaluate potential attacks. Given the difficulty in providing total privacy (i.e., free of vulner-
abilities), we propose to document the mitigations in form of evidences, aiming to increase
the confidence of the project. The evidences should be structured using the Goal Structuring
Notation (GSN), a graphical argumentation notation that can be used to document explicitly
the individual elements of any argument and, perhaps more significantly, the relationships
that exist between these elements. Arguments documented using GSN can help to provide
privacy assurance.
To validate the effectiveness of PbE, we conduct four case studies, executing the activities
described here in smart energy metering, people counting, energy efficiency, and a two factor
authentication applications. These are examples of applications that are growing in numbers,
and their usage may bring privacy risks, causing many people and even the media to show
distrust about them.
The main objective of these case studies is to assess the ability of PbE in producing
evidences of privacy. In order to achieve this objective we defined three research questions
using the Goal, Question, Metric (GQM) paradigm, a mechanism for defining and evaluating
goals using measurement. The defined research questions were:
• RQ1: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly smart energy metering application?
• RQ2: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly people counting application?
• RQ3: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly energy efficiency application?
• RQ4: Is PbE helpful to develop a privacy-friendly two factor authentication applica-
tion?
To answer these three questions, we use the metrics of number of provided evidences and
their sum of weights. For the smart energy metering application (LiteMe), using the PbE, we
were able to provide seven evidences of privacy, and the sum of their weights resulted in 28.
For the people counting application (Pulso), we were able to provide five evidences and the
sum of their weights resulted in 19. For the energy efficiency application (Lumen), we were
able to provide five evidences, and the sum of their weights resulted in 19 too. The two factor
authentication was developed by an external team and we used the Think Aloud protocol to
115
observe the process. In this case study, the team provided four evidences of privacy, and the
sum of their weights resulted 86. We positively support all the four research questions (RQ1,
RQ2, RQ3 and RQ4) and claim that PbE is an effective way to develope privacy-friendly
applications.
During the condution of the case studies, we had many lessons learned and received
many feedbacks in order to improve the methodology. For example, the activity of “Iden-
tify Utilities and Risk Assessment” demonstrated to be hard and subjective. Therefore, the
condution of privacy perception studies is a useful task to help in this activity and to identify
and quantify privacy concerns. Another insight was that the activity of “Evaluate Potential
Attacks” demonstrated to be important when developing privacy-friendly applications. The
identification of working attacks in this activity and the need to return to previous activities in
order to mitigate the risks indicate that without the attack evaluations, developers would just
proceed to deployment/production phases. Another insight was that less experienced devel-
opers may confuse the concepts of security and privacy. This suggests that, before starting
the development, it would be useful for the developers to have a small period of training
regarding security, privacy, and their differences.
Based on the experience obtained from the analysis of the case studies, we noticed that
all the artifacts presented in the checklist of Table 3.1 are important. However, a minimal
set of artifacts that we recommend would be the following: Engagement Report, Summary
of Norms, Privacy Concerns, Adversary Model, Summary of Techniques, Implementation of
Techniques, and Summary of Attacks. This minimal set was defined based on the need to
maintain the usual workflow of PbE and to allow the privacy understanding and the actual
state by the participants of the project.
A limitation of this work is that we did not conduct a quantitative experiment with a
set development teams using PbE and another set of teams not using PbE. That experiment
would provide results with statistical confidence regarding the effectiveness of PbE in devel-
oping privacy-friendly applications. Therefore, we leave the conduction of this experiment
as a possible future work.
Bibliography
[1] Myths about /dev/urandom. https://www.2uo.de/myths-about-urandom/, March 2018.
[2] OASIS Privacy Management Reference Model (PMRM) TC. https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/pmrm, March 2018.
[3] The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). https://www.eugdpr.org, Febru-
ary 2018.
[4] The Tor project. https://www.torproject.org, February 2018.
[5] M. Anas, N. Javaid, A. Mahmood, S. M. Raza, U. Qasim, and Z. A. Khan. Minimizing
electricity theft using smart meters in AMI. In Proc. of the IEEE Seventh International
Conf. on P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet Computing (3PGCIC), pages 176–
182, Victoria, Canada, August 2012.
[6] I. Anati, S. Gueron, S. Johnson, and V. Scarlata. Innovative technology for CPU
based attestation and sealing. https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/innovative-
technology-for-cpu-based-attestation-and-sealing, August 2013.
[7] M. Andrew, M. Malte, L. Kevin, and N. Arvind. An Empirical Analysis of Linkability
in the Monero Blockchain. https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.04299, April 2017.
[8] M. Backes and S. Meiser. Differentially Private Smart Metering with Battery Recharg-
ing. In Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security, pages
194–212, New York, NY, USA, 2014. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.
[9] Boaz Barak, Oded Goldreich, Russell Impagliazzo, Steven Rudich, Amit Sahai, Salil
Vadhan, and Ke Yang. On the (Im)Possibility of Obfuscating Programs. 59:6:1–6:48,
May 2012.
116
BIBLIOGRAPHY 117
[10] M. Barbaro and J. T. Zeller. A face is exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749.
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/09aol.html, Au-
gust 2006.
[11] P. Barbosa, A. Brito, and H. Almeida. Defending Against Load Monitoring in Smart
Metering Data Through Noise Addition. In Proc. of the 30th Annual ACM Symposium
on Applied Computing (SAC), pages 2218–2224, Salamanca, Spain, April 2015.
[12] P. Barbosa, A. Brito, and H. Almeida. A Technique to provide differential privacy for
appliance usage in smart metering. Information Sciences, 370-371:355–367, Novem-
ber 2016.
[13] P. Barbosa, A. Brito, H. Almeida, and S. Clauß. Lightweight privacy for smart me-
tering data by adding noise. In Proc. of the 29th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied
Computing (SAC), pages 531–538, Gyeongju, South Korea, March 2014.
[14] P. Barbosa, J. L. Silva, A. Brito, and L. Silva. Privacy Preserving Techniques in Smart
Metering: An Overview. In XVI Brazilian Symposium on Information and Compu-
tational Systems Security (SBSeg), pages 30–43, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, November
2016.
[15] G. Barnett. Harnessing Data in the Internet of Things, Strategies for managing data
in a connected world. https://tdwi.org/whitepapers/2015/07/ibm_harnessing-data-in-
the-internet-of-things.aspx, 2015.
[16] L. Baruh and Z. Cemalcilar. It is more than personal: Development and validation of
a multidimensional privacy orientation scale. Personality and Individual Differences,
70:165 – 170, 2014.
[17] R. V. Basili. Software Modeling and Measurement: The Goal/Question/Metric
Paradigm. Technical report, College Park, MD, USA, 1992.
[18] N. Batra, H. Dutta, and A. Singh. INDiC: Improved Non-intrusive Load Monitoring
Using Load Division and Calibration. In IEEE 12th International Conf. on Machine
Learning and Applications (ICMLA), volume 1, pages 79–84, Dec 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 118
[19] N. Batra, J. Kelly, O. Parson, H. Dutta, W. Knottenbelt, A. Rogers, A. Singh, and
M. Srivastava. NILMTK: An Open Source Toolkit for Non-intrusive Load Monitor-
ing. In Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Future Energy Systems,
e-Energy ’14, pages 265–276, New York, NY, USA, 2014. ACM.
[20] R. Beckwith. Designing for ubiquity: The perception of privacy. IEEE Pervasive
computing, 2(2):40 – 46, 2003.
[21] M. Bellare and O. Goldreich. On Defining Proofs of Knowledge. In 12th Annual In-
ternational Cryptology Conference, pages 390–420, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August
1993. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[22] A. R. Beresford, D. Kübler, and S. Preibusch. Price versus privacy: an experiment into
the competitive advantage of collecting less personal information. In forthcoming in
Electronic Commerce Research, August 2013.
[23] J. Bhatia, T. D. Breaux, and F. Schaub. Mining Privacy Goals from Privacy Poli-
cies Using Hybridized Task Recomposition. ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol.,
25(3):22:1–22:24, May 2016.
[24] A. Blum, K. Ligett, and A. Roth. A Learning Theory Approach to Non-interactive
Database Privacy. In Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory
of Computing, STOC ’08, pages 609–618, New York, NY, USA, 2008. ACM.
[25] C. Boccuzzi. Smart Grid e o big brother Energético. Metering International América
Latina, 3:82–83, 2010.
[26] J. Bohli, C. Sorge, and O. Ugus. A privacy model for smart metering. In Proc. IEEE
International Conf. Communications Workshops (ICC), pages 1–5, Cape Town, South
Africa, May 2010.
[27] T. Boren and J. Ramey. Thinking aloud: Reconciling theory and practice. 43:261 –
278, October 2000.
[28] C. Bowman, A. Gesher, J. K. Grant, and D. Slate. The Architecture of Privacy: On
Engineering Technologies that can Deliver Trustworthy Safeguards. Oreilly and As-
sociate Series. O’Reilly Media, Incorporated, 2015.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 119
[29] R. Boyd. Getting Started with OAuth 2.0. Oreilly and Associate Series. O’Reilly
Media, Incorporated, 2012.
[30] N. Busom, R. Petrlic, F. Sebé, C. Sorge, and M. Valls. Efficient smart metering based
on homomorphic encryption. Computer Communications, pages 95–101, September
2015.
[31] A. Cavoukian. Privacy by Design - The 7 Foundational Principles, August 2009.
[32] CER. Commission for Energy Regulation – CER smart metering project. Smart Meter
Electricity Trial data, December 2012.
[33] D. Chaum. The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender and Recipient
Untraceability. Journal of Cryptology., 1(1):65–75, March 1988.
[34] S. Chawla, C. Dwork, F. McSherry, A. Smith, and H. Wee. Toward Privacy in Pub-
lic Databases. In Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Theory of
Cryptography, TCC’05, pages 363–385, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. Springer-Verlag.
[35] T. Dalenius. Finding a Needle In a Haystack or Identifying Anonymous Census
Records. Journal of Official Statistics, 2(3):329–336, 1986.
[36] Datameer. Big Data Analytics and the Internet of Things.
https://www.datameer.com/pdf/eBook-Internet-of-Things.pdf, 2015.
[37] C. Dwork. Differential Privacy. In Proc. of the 33rd International Colloquium on
Automata, Languages and Programming, part II (ICALP), pages 1–12, Venice, Italy,
July 2006.
[38] C. Dwork. Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results. In Proc. of the 5th International
Conf. of Theory and Applications of Models of Computation (TAMC), pages 1–19,
Xi’an, China, April 2008.
[39] EDPS. European Data Protection Supervisor – Opinion on coherent enforcement of
fundamental rights in the age of big data, September 2016.
[40] K. E. Emam. Guide to the de-identification of personal health information. CRC
Press, 2013.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 120
[41] Z. Erkin and G. Tsudik. Private Computation of Spatial and Temporal Power Con-
sumption with Smart Meters. In Proc. of the 10th Int. Conf. on Applied Cryptography
and Network Security (ACNS), pages 561–577, June 2012.
[42] B. C. M. Fung, K. Wang, A. W-C. Fu, and P. S. Yu. Introduction to Privacy-Preserving
Data Publishing: Concepts and Techniques. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2010.
[43] F. D. Garcia and B. Jacobs. Privacy-Friendly Energy-Metering via Homomorphic En-
cryption. In Security and Trust Management, volume 6710, pages 226–238, Septem-
ber 2010.
[44] J. Gehrke, E. Lui, and R. Pass. Towards Privacy for Social Networks: A Zero-
knowledge Based Definition of Privacy. In Proceedings of the 8th Conference on The-
ory of Cryptography, TCC’11, pages 432–449, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011. Springer-
Verlag.
[45] The GSN Working Group Online. Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), November 2011.
www.goalstructuringnotation.info.
[46] S. Gurses, C. Troncoso, and C. Diaz. Engineering Privacy by Design. In Computers,
Privacy & Data Protection, page 25, Brusels, Belgium, 2011.
[47] X. He, X. Zhang, and C. C. J. Kuo. A Distortion-Based Approach to Privacy-
Preserving Metering in Smart Grids. IEEE Access, 1:67–78, May 2013.
[48] M. Hoekstra, R. Lal, P. Pappachan, V. Phegade, and J. Del Cuvillo. Using innovative
instructions to create trustworthy software solutions. In Proceedings of the 2Nd Inter-
national Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy,
HASP ’13, pages 11:1–11:1, New York, NY, USA, 2013. ACM.
[49] D. Ilic´, P. G. Silva, S. Karnouskos, and M. Jacobi. Impact assessment of smart meter
grouping on the accuracy of forecasting algorithms. In Proc. of the 28th Annual ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC), pages 673–679, Coimbra, Portugal, March
2013.
[50] INMETRO. Portaria número 375, de 27 de Setembro de 2011.
http://www.inmetro.gov.br/legislacao/rtac/pdf/RTAC001738.pdf, 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 121
[51] T. Ionescu and G. Engelbrecht. The Privacy Case. In Joint Workshop on Cyber-
Physical Security and Resilience in Smart Grids, Vienna, AUT, April 2016.
[52] J. S. John. Big data on the smart grid: 2013 in review and 2014 out-
look. http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Big-Datas-5-Big-Steps-to-Smart-
Grid-Growth-in-2014, 2013.
[53] G. Kalogridis, C. Efthymiou, S. Z. Denic, T. A. Lewis, and R. Cepeda. Privacy for
smart meters: towards undetectable appliance load signatures. In IEEE 1st Inter-
national Conf. on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pages 232–237,
Gaithersburg, USA, October 2010.
[54] T. Kelly and R. Weaver. The goal structuring notation - a safety argument notation.
In Proc. of the dependable systems and networks workshop on assurance cases, Flo-
rence, July 2004.
[55] O. Koehle. Just say no to big brother‘s smart meters. The latest in bio-hazard tech-
nology. ARC Reproductions, 2012.
[56] J. Z. Kolter and M. J. Johnson. REDD: A public data set for energy disaggregation re-
search. In Proc. of the ACM workshop on Data Mining Applications in Sustainability,
pages 1–6, USA, August 2011.
[57] N. Koudas, T. Yu, D. Srivastava, and Q. Zhang. Aggregate Query Answering on
Anonymized Tables. 2007 IEEE 23rd International Conference on Data Engineering,
pages 116–125, 2007.
[58] K. Lauter, M. Naehrig, and V. Vaikuntanathan. Can Homomorphic Encryption be
Practical? In Proc. of 3rd ACM workshop on Cloud computing security (CCSW),
pages 113–124, Illinois, USA, October 2011.
[59] J. Lee and C. Clifton. How Much is Enough? Choosing  for Differential Privacy. In
Proc. of the 14th International Conf. on Information Security, ISC’11, pages 325–340,
Xi’an, China, October 2011.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 122
[60] F. Li, B. Luo, and P. Liu. Secure Information Aggregation for Smart Grids Using
Homomorphic Encryption. In IEEE 1st International Conf. on Smart Grid Communi-
cations, pages 327–332, Gaithersburg, USA, October 2010.
[61] J. Li, Y. Tao, and X. Xiao. Preservation of Proximity Privacy in Publishing Numerical
Sensitive Data. In Proceedings of the 2008 ACM SIGMOD International Conference
on Management of Data, SIGMOD ’08, pages 473–486, New York, NY, USA, 2008.
ACM.
[62] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. Gehrke, and M. Venkitasubramaniam. L-diversity:
Privacy Beyond K-anonymity. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data, 1(1), March 2007.
[63] K. Makanda and J. C. Jeon. Key Distribution Protocol on Quantum Cryptography. In
2013 International Conference on IT Convergence and Security (ICITCS), pages 1–2,
Dec 2013.
[64] F. McKeen, I. Alexandrovich, A. Berenzon, C. v. Rozas, H. Shafi, V. Shanbhogue, and
U. R. Savagaonkar. Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution.
In Proceedings of the 2Nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural
Support for Security and Privacy, HASP ’13, pages 10:1–10:1, New York, NY, USA,
2013. ACM.
[65] S. McLaughlin, P. McDaniel, and W. Aiello. Protecting consumer privacy from elec-
tric load monitoring. In Proc. of the 18th ACM Conf. on Computer and Communica-
tions Security (CCS), pages 87–98, Illinois, USA, October 2011.
[66] R. Mekovec. Online privacy: overview and preliminary research. Journal of Informa-
tion and Organizational Sciences, 34(2):195 – 209, 2010.
[67] I. Miers, C. Garman, M. Green, and A. D. Rubin. Zerocoin: Anonymous Distributed
E-Cash from Bitcoin. In 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 397–
411, May 2013.
[68] K. Molokken-Ostvold, N. C. Haugen, and H. C. Benestad. Using planning poker for
combining expert estimates in software projects. J. Syst. Softw., 81(12):2106–2117,
December 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 123
[69] A. C. Myers and B. Liskov. Protecting Privacy Using the Decentralized Label Model.
ACM Trans. Softw. Eng. Methodol., 9(4):410–442, October 2000.
[70] M. E. Nergiz, C. Clifton, and A. E. Nergiz. Multirelational k-Anonymity. IEEE Trans.
on Knowl. and Data Eng., 21(8):1104–1117, August 2009.
[71] J. Nielsen. Usability Engineering. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers Inc., San Francisco,
CA, USA, 1993.
[72] L. Ninghui, L. Tiancheng, and S. Venkatasubramanian. t-Closeness: Privacy beyond
k-anonymity and l-diversity, pages 106–115. 2007.
[73] NIST. National Institute of Standards and Technology – Guidelines for smart grid
cybersecurity: Vol. 2 - Privacy and the smart grid, September 2014.
[74] Nokia. Privacy Engineering & Assurance, September 2014.
www.w3.org/2014/privacyws/pp/Hirsch.pdf.
[75] Object Management Group - OMG. Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM),
July 2015. www.omg.org/spec/SACM.
[76] Bankinter Foundation of Innovation. The Internet of Things In a Connected World
of Smart Objects. https://www.fundacionbankinter.org/documents/20183/42758/
PDF+Internet+of+things/397ad508-7dde-45b6-97cb-459dcb723023, 2011.
[77] I. Oliver. Privacy Engineering: A Dataflow and Ontological Approach. 2014.
[78] pidoco. POWERFUL PROTOTYPING. Think Aloud.
https://pidoco.com/en/help/ux/think-aloud, 2017.
[79] B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, G. Segev, and M. Zohner. Phasing: Private Set Intersection
Using Permutation-based Hashing. In 24th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 15), pages 515–530, Washington, D.C., 2015. USENIX Association.
[80] L. Ponciano, P. Barbosa, F. Brasileiro, A. Brito, and N. Andrade. Designing for
Pragmatists and Fundamentalists: Privacy Concerns and Attitudes on the Internet of
Things. In XVI Brazilian Symposium on Human Factors in Computing Systems (IHC),
Joinville, Brazil, October 2017.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 124
[81] Procel. Manual de tarifação da energia elétrica. Programa nacional de conservação de
energia. Eletrobras, August 2011.
[82] B. Raghunathan. The Complete Book of Data Anonymization. CRC Press, 2013.
[83] V. Rastogi, D. Suciu, and S. Hong. The Boundary Between Privacy and Utility in
Data Publishing. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Very Large
Data Bases, VLDB ’07, pages 531–542. VLDB Endowment, 2007.
[84] A. Reinhardt, P. Baumann, D. Burgstahler, M. Hollick, H. Chonov, M. Werner, and
R. Steinmetz. On the Accuracy of Appliance Identification Based on Distributed Load
Metering Data. In Proc. of the 2nd IFIP Conf. on Sust. Internet and ICT for Sustain-
ability, pages 1–9, 2012.
[85] A. Samani, H. Ghenniwa, and A. Wahaishi. Privacy in Internet of Things: A Model
and Protection Framework. Procedia Computer Science, 52:606–613, 2015.
[86] L. H. Scholz. Information Privacy and Data Security. In Cardozo Law Review de
Novo, June 2015.
[87] K. S. Schwaig, A. H. Segars, V. Grover, and K. D. Fiedler. A Model of Consumers’
Perceptions of the Invasion of Information Privacy. Inf. Manage., 50(1):1–12, January
2013.
[88] A. Shamir. How to Share a Secret. Communications of the ACM, 22(11):612–613,
November 1979.
[89] R. Silva, P. Barbosa, and A. Brito. DynSGX: A Privacy Preserving Toolset for Di-
namically Loading Functions into Intel(R) SGX Enclaves. In 2017 IEEE Interna-
tional Conference on Cloud Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), pages
314–321, Dec. 2017.
[90] R. Singel. Netflix Spilled Your Brokeback Mountain Secret, Lawsuit Claims.
https://www.wired.com/2009/12/netflix-privacy-lawsuit/, December 2009.
[91] M. Someren, Y. Barnard, and J. Sandberg. The Think Aloud Method - A Practical
Guide to Modelling CognitiveProcesses. January 1994.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 125
[92] W. Stallings and L. Brawn. Computer Security: Principles and Practice. Pearson, 3
edition, 2015.
[93] J. Stweart, M. Chapple, and D. Gibson. Certified Information Systems. SYBEX, 7
edition, 2015.
[94] L. Sweeney. Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely. In Carnegie
Mellon University, Data Privacy, USA, 2000.
[95] L. Sweeney. k-Anonymity: A model for protecting privacy. International Journal of
Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, pages 557–570, 2002.
[96] U.S. Departament of Health & Human Services. Guidance Regarding Methods for
De-identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with The Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Privacy Rule, November 2012.
[97] K. Wang and B. C. M. Fung. Anonymizing Sequential Releases. In Proceedings of
the 12th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining, KDD ’06, pages 414–423, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[98] K. Wang, B. C. M. Fung, and P. S. Yu. Handicapping Attacker’s Confidence: An
Alternative to K-anonymization. Knowl. Inf. Syst., 11(3):345–368, April 2007.
[99] S. Wang, L. Cui, J. Que, D.-H. Choi, X. Jiang, and L. Xie. A randomized response
model for privacy preserving smart metering. IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, 3:1317–
1324, September 2012.
[100] G. Waters. Conquering Advanced Metering Cost and Risk. Electric Energy T&D
Magazine, 10:22–25, November 2006.
[101] C. Wohlin, P. Runeson, M. Höst, M. C. Ohlsson, B. Regnell, and A. Wesslén. Experi-
mentation in Software Engineering. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
[102] R. C. Wong, J. Li, A. W. Fu, and K. Wang. (α, K)-anonymity: An Enhanced K-
anonymity Model for Privacy Preserving Data Publishing. In Proceedings of the 12th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
KDD ’06, pages 754–759, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 126
[103] X. Xiao and Y. Tao. Personalized Privacy Preservation. In Proceedings of the 2006
ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, SIGMOD ’06,
pages 229–240, New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
[104] M. Z. Yao, R. E. Rice, and K. Wallis. Predicting user concerns about online privacy.
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 58(5):710
– 722, 2007.
[105] L. Ying-Xun, L. Chin-Feng, H. Yueh-Min, and C. Han-Chieh. Multi-appliance recog-
nition system with hybrid SVM/GMM classifier in ubiquitous smart home. Informa-
tion Sciences, 230:39–55, 2013.
[106] Zebra. Analysis of iOS 8 MAC Randomization on Locationing.
http://mpact.zebra.com/ documents/iOS8-White-Paper.pdf, 2015.
[107] J. Zhao, T. Jung, Y. Wang, and X. Li. Achieving differential privacy of data disclosure
in the smart grid. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, pages 504–512, April 2014.
Appendix A
Catalog of Privacy Techniques
This appendix presents a catalog of privacy techniques, aiming to guide developers in
choosing the most suited ones, according to their specific context. The catalog contains
a number of techniques for manipulating and measuring information for the purpose of
enhancing privacy which can be applied together as required to architect a solution. This list
is not exaustive, and is based on the experience of the author.
Privacy Technique Comments
Asymmetric Encryption Uses two keys, one to encrypt and another one to decrypt [92], [82]. Examples
of asymmetric encryption algorithms are RSA, Elgamal and ECC.
Symmetric Encryption Same key used to encrypt and decrypt [92], [82]. Examples of symmetric en-
cryption algorithms are AES, 3DES and RC4.
Hashing Hash functions are typically one-way functions such that computing their inverse
is computationally expensive [92], [82], [77]. Examples of hashing algorithms
are SHA256 and scrypt.
Homomorphic Encryp-
tion
A form of encryption that allows computation on ciphertexts, generating an en-
crypted result which, when decrypted, matches the result of the operations as if
they had been performed on the plaintext [58], [60], [43], [41], [30].
Secret Exchange Enables two parties to produce a shared random secret known only to them,
which can, for example, be used as a key to encrypt and decrypt messages. Ex-
amples of algorithms are Diff-Hellman and QKD [63].
Secret Sharing Splits a secret amongst a group of participants, each of whom is allocated a share
of the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number of
shares are combined together; individual shares are of no use on their own [88].
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Zero-knowledge proof A method by which one party (the prover) can prove to another party (the verifier)
that a given statement is true, without conveying any information apart from the
fact that the statement is indeed true [21].
Private Set Intersection Allows two parties to compute the intersection of private sets while revealing
nothing more than the intersection itself [79].
Trusted Execution Envi-
ronment
Allows software developers control of the security of sensitive code and data by
creating trusted domains within applications to protect critical information during
execution and at rest [48], [64].
Dynamic Private Code
Execution
Loads and unloads code to be executed in a trusted execution environment. Pro-
tects application code and libraries, defending against reverse engineering [89].
Code Obfuscation Makes code difficult for humans to understand and programmers may deliber-
ately obfuscate code to conceal its purpose (security through obscurity), primar-
ily, in order to prevent reverse engineering [9].
Access Control Means of ensuring proportionality in data access, controlling data usage, and
enhancing security beyond the broad system-access level [28].
Generalization Replaces a specific value with a general value, according to a given taxonomy.
For a numerical attribute, exact values can be replaced with an interval that covers
exact values [42]. The usage of this technique usually provides K-anonymity
properties.
Pseudonymity The act of hiding the identity through the usage of false ones [42].
Supression Remove values or replace them with a special value, indicating that the replaced
values are not disclosed [42].
Anatomization De-associates the relationship between the sensitive data and the identities into
different groups. The major advantage is that the data in both sets are unmodified
[42].
Permutation Same idea of anatomization, but after de-associating, shuffles the sensitive values
within each group [42].
Noise Addition The general idea is to replace the original sensitive value s with s + r where r
is a random value drawn from some distribution [42], [12]. The usage of this
technique usually provides Differential-Privacy properties.
Data Swapping The general idea is to exchange values of sensitive attributes among individual
records while the swaps maintain the low-order frequency counts or marginals
for statistical analysis [42], [82].
Synthetic Data The general idea is to build a statistical model from the data and then to sample
points from the model. These sampled points form the synthetic data, to be used
instead of the original data [42].
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DC-Nets Provide anonymity of both sender and receiver by establishing some anonymous
channels for message transmission [33].
Relay Network Enables anonymity in the network for users (e.g., Tor browser) and servers (e.g.,
onion services) [4], defending against network surveillance and traffic analysis.
Private cryptocurrencies Some cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, lack privacy guarantees. However, other
proposals that allow anonymity such as Zerocoin [67] and Monero [7] have been
suggested.
Appendix B
Other Privacy Techniques in Smart
Metering
B.1 Rechargeable Batteries
Rechargeable batteries between appliances and smart meters can help to reduce the privacy
issues as the appliance signatures are no longer legible [8; 53; 65; 107].
Mclaughlin et al. [65] propose an approach called Non-Intrusive Load Leveling (NILL).
The goal of a NILL system is to level the load profile to a constant target load, thus removing
appliance signatures. When an appliance turns ON, it will exert a load beyond the target load.
Thus, NILL will discharge the battery to partially supply the load created by the appliance,
maintaining the target load. Similarly, if an appliance enters the OFF state, the load profile
will decrease below the target load. These opportunities are used to charge the battery while
restoring the target load.
The NILL system consists of two parts: a battery and a control system that regulates the
battery’s charge and discharge based on the present load and battery state. The controller
attempts to maintain a steady state target load KSS , but will go into one of two special states
KL or KH if the battery needs to recover from a low or high state of charge.
The essence of NILL is described by the equation, u(t) = d(t) + b(t), where b(t) is the
battery’s rate of charge overtime, d(t) is the actual load profile of the residence and u(t) is
the load under the influence of NILL as perceived by the smart meter and what is disclosed
to the power provider. If b(t) > 0, the battery is charging, otherwise b(t) < 0 and the battery
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is discharging. Finally, c(t) is used to represent the battery’s state of charge, thus:
c(t) =
∫ t
t0
b(t)dt+ c(t0) .
Therefore, c(t) is monitored. If c(t) < L, where L is the lower safe limit on the battery’s
state of charge, then the battery needs to be recharged and the system goes to the KL state.
Similarly, if c(t) > H , the system goes to the KH state and the battery is discharged.
B.2 Using a Modified ElGamal Encryption
The first homomorphic encryption solution that we consider is based on a modification in the
ElGamal encryption, a cryptographic system that relies on the discrete logarithm problem.
The ElGamal cryptosystem proceeds as follows:
• Set up: a large prime q is chosen. Next, a generator g of the cyclic group Z∗q is selected.
• Key generation: a secret key x is generated by setting its value as a random number
x ∈R Z∗q . The corresponding public key is computed as y = gx.
• Encryption: a message m ∈ G is encrypted under public key y by taking a random
number r ∈R Z∗q and computing c = gr and d = m · yr. The ElGamal encryption of
m under public key y, Ey(m), is the tuple (c, d).
• Decryption: a ciphertext Ey(m) is decrypted using the private key x by computing
m = d · c−x.
Given messages m1 and m2, we can obtain an encryption of m1 ·m2 by computing:
Ey(m1) · Ey(m2) = (c1 · c2, d1 · d2)
= (gr1+r2 ,m1 ·m2 · yr1+r2)
= Ey(m1 ·m2) .
Hence, ElGamal is a multiplicative homomorphic cryptosystem.
To calculate the total consumption in a region, Busom et al. [30] propose a protocol
which uses an additive ElGamal cryptosystem. Given Ey(gm1) and Ey(gm2), then, Ey(gm1) ·
Ey(g
m2) = Ey(g
m1 · gm2) = Ey(gm1+m2).
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Initially, each smart meter possess the following values: a big prime number q and its
generator g; a secret key xi; a public key yi = gxi . To encrypt the measurements, it is
necessary a global public key y =
N∏
i=1
yi.
Let mi denote the measurement of a smart meter. To calculate the total consumption in
the region, the following protocol is executed:
1. Each meter generates a random noise value zi ∈ Z∗q and computes a ciphertext as
Ci = Ey(g
mi+zi) = (ci, di) which is sent to the aggregator (which can be the power
provider).
2. The aggregator combines all the messages as C = (
N∏
i=1
ci,
N∏
i=1
di) = (c, d) and sends c
to each meter.
3. Each meter computes Ti = cxi · gzi and sends the result to the aggregator. After that,
each meter removes zi from its memory.
4. Finally, the aggregator computes D = d · (
N∏
i=1
Ti)
−1 and loggD = M =
N∑
i=1
mi, where
M is the total consumption in the region.
Notice that, since M is a relatively small number, the discrete logarithm problem in step
4 can be solved in a short time. In step 2, the aggregator computes:
C = (
N∏
i=1
gri ,
N∏
i=1
gmi+zi · yri) = (gr, gM+z · yr) = (c, d) ,
and in step 3, each meter computes:
Ti = c
xi · gzi = gr·xi · gzi = gxi·r · gzi = yri · gzi .
Therefore, the protocol works because in step 4 the aggregator computes:
D = d · (
N∏
i=1
Ti)
−1 =
gM+z · yr
N∏
i=1
(yri · gzi)
=
gM+z · yr
(
N∏
i=1
yri ) · gz
=
gM+z · yr
gz · yr = g
M .
B.3 Using Paillier Encryption and Secret Sharing
A protocol based on Paillier encryption and secret sharing was proposed by Garcia et al.
[43]. The Paillier cryptosystem proceeds as follows:
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• Set up: two large primes p and q are chosen, n = p · q, and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
A random number g ∈R Z∗n2 is chosen in such a way that gcd(b, n) = 1, where
b = L(gλ mod n2) and L(u) = (u−1)
n
.
• Key generation: let µ be the modular multiplicative inverse of b modulo n, i.e., µ =
b−1 mod n. Thus, the public key is Pk = (n, g) and the private key is Sk = (n, λ, µ).
• Encryption: a messagem is encrypted under public key Pk by taking a random number
r ∈R Z∗n−1 and computing EPk(m) = gm · rn mod n2.
• Decryption: a ciphertext c = EPk(m) is decrypted using the private key Sk by com-
puting m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ mod n.
Given messages m1 and m2, we can obtain an encryption of m1 +m2 by computing:
EPk(m1) · EPk(m2) = gm1 · rn1 · gm2 · rn2 mod n2
= gm1+m2 · (r1 · r2)n mod n2
= EPk(m1 +m2) .
Hence, Paillier is an additive homomorphic cryptosystem.
Garcia et al. [43] propose that each smart meter possess a public key Pki and a private
key Ski. Let mi denote the measurement of the meter. To calculate the total consumption in
the region, the following protocol is executed:
1. Each meter sends its public key to the aggregator.
2. The aggregator receives all public keys and shares them with all meters. Thus, each
meter stays with its private key Ski and all the public keys {Pk1, Pk2, . . . , Pkn}.
3. Each meter calculates N secret shares for its measurement mi, in such a way that
mi =
N∑
j=1
sij . Then, the meter keeps sii privately and sends to the aggregator all the
other secret shares encrypted with the public keys of the other N − 1 meters, i.e., it
sends EPkj(sij) for j = 1, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N .
4. After receiving all the encrypted secret shares, the aggregator multiplies the ones en-
crypted with the same public key. Due to the Paillier homomorphic property, for each
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meter i, it has EPki(m
′
i) =
N∏
j 6=i
EPki(sji) = EPki(
N∑
j 6=i
sji). Then, the aggregator sends
EPki(m
′
i) for each meter i.
5. Using its private key Ski, each meter decrypts EPki(m
′
i) and adds its sii, obtaining
N∑
j=1
sji. The meter then sends this value to the aggregator.
6. Finally, the aggregator can sum all the received values, obtaining the total consumption
in the region M =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
sji.
In this approach, the total consumption in the region is computed and at the same time,
neither the aggregator nor any other consumer has access to any real measurement from a
consumer, for they can only access random shares. Since in step 6 the aggregator simply
sum all the secret shares, the proof that the protocol works is straightforward.
B.4 Using a Modified Paillier Encryption
Erkin et al. [41] propose a protocol based on a modification in the Paillier encryption. Start-
ing, there is a single pair of Paillier keys (Pk and Sk) shared with all N meters. Let mi
denote the measurement of the meter. To calculate the total consumption in the region, the
following protocol is executed:
1. Each meter generates N − 1 random numbers, one for every one of the other meters,
and sends them using secure communication (e.g., RSA encryption between meters).
Thus, there is a total of N · (N − 1) message exchanges in this step.
2. After receiving all the random numbers generated by the other meters, the meter com-
putes Ri = n +
N∑
j 6=i
r(i→j) −
N∑
j 6=i
r(j→i), where n is the Paillier modulo and r(i→j) is the
random number generated by the meter i for the meter j.
3. Following, the meter computes a hash ht using the timestamp of the current measure-
ment mi. This hash must be coprime with the Paillier modulo n, i.e., gcd(ht, n) = 1.
Since the timestamp is synchronized, the obtained hash is the same for all meters.
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4. After computingRi and ht, the meter encryptsmi using the following modified scheme
of Paillier: EPk(mi) = g
mi · hRit . Then, this encrypted measurement is disclosed to all
other N − 1 meters.
5. Finally, after receiving all the encrypted measurements of the other meters, the meter
calculates EPk(M) =
N∏
i=1
EPk(mi) = EPk(
N∑
i=1
mi). This is true due the homomorphic
property.
PossessingEPk(M), the meter can decrypt this value and then send the total consumption
in the region M to the aggregator. This way, the total consumption is computed and privacy
is preserved, for the meter does not have access to the other measurements in plaintext.
The protocol works because in step 5, the meter computes:
EPk(M) = g
m1+m2+···+mN · h
(
N∑
i=1
n)+(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
r(i→j))−(
N∑
i=1
N∑
j 6=i
r(j→i))
t ,
and
EPk(M) = g
M · hN ·nt .
Considering that r = hNt , this configuration represents the original paillier cryptosystem.
